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projet de recherche
Controlling Systemic Risks: Macroprudential regulation as a cognitive and a political-economic project
How do economists’ ideas regarding financial markets influence financial market regulation? We know little about the causal pathways by which academic discourses influence policy making and how they interact with interests and institutional design. This project seeks to address this knowledge gap. The regulatory failures in banking regulation, which became evident with the outbreak of the financial crisis, led to a virulent questioning of the then pre-dominant policy paradigm. Since then, a new macroprudential approach to financial regulation has taken hold, characterized by some as an ideational paradigm shift. This new approach attempts to maintain the financial stability of the financial system as a whole through controlling systemic risks in the “time-dimension” (pro-cyclicality) and the “cross-sectional dimension” (the interdependence and interaction of the institutions). Financial market regulations are based on cognitive models, which compete for their validity within the academic field. At the same time, they imply changes in the jurisdictional claims by regulators and threaten the interests of market actors.
The goal of this research project is to understand how the measures adopted in the Basel III framework as well as in in different legislations relate to the discussion in the academic literature, thus to understand under which conditions academic ideas get translated and transformed into policy tools . By providing a clear definition of the ideational variables related to systemic risk and macroprudential regulation, a careful study of the implementation process and the direct influence these ideas exert on actors, I seek to directly observe the interaction of cognitive work and the political economy within which it is embedded.
Matthias Thiemann is an assistant professor at Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universitaet Frankfurt am Main. He was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Center for Capitalism, Globalization and Governance in 2012-2013.
His research focuses on the capacity of nation states to limit the rule bending activity of banks and financial market actors in an era of globalized finance. His doctoral thesis in particular focuses on the regulation of a particular segment of the bank-based shadow banking sector in different European countries before the crisis and the reasons for the different stances towards regulatory circumvention occurring in this segment. He defends his doctoral thesis at Columbia University in September 2012. He holds an MA in Global Political Economy and Finance from the New School in NYC (2007) and a Diplom in Social Sciences from Humboldt Universitaet Berlin (2009).
He has published on the regulation of shadow banks in Europe in the business journal “Competition and Change” and in the FEPS Working Paper Series, and on the need for general regulatory reform in the UNDP Discussion Paper Series.
He has published book chapters and articles on the strategies of freelance web designers in NYC to secure work and structure their work-life balance with the help of their social networks (2010, 2011), on social network theory and social change (2007, 2009) and on social networks and their impact on school success (2006).
He has also worked as a consultant for the United Nations on regulatory reform in financial markets and its impact on developing countries (2011).
Research interests : The interaction between regulators, regulation and the regulated in the formation of the shadow banking system and the attempt of regulators to re-envision financial markets in order to monitor and control systemic risk, stemming from the shadow banking system. Particular attention is paid to the role of economics in the measurement and management of the latter and the political economy inherent in the evolution of this regulation.