ISSN 2263-1577

perspectives

Journal Réseau français des Instituts d'études avancées

n. 12 — hiver | winter 2014-2015 www.rfiea.fr

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perspectives n. 12

ISSN 2263-1577
Parution : novembre 2014
Directeur de la publication : Olivier Bouin
Édition : Julien Ténédos
Crédits photos : Tous les portraits des résidents ont été réalisés par Christophe Delory.
L'équipe du RFIEA tient à remercier chaleureusement pour leur contribution : Gabriel Abend, Barbara Allen, Alistair Cole, Monica Dietl, Alena Ledeneva, Giuseppe Longo, Salikoko Mufwene, Tamar Pitch, Ourania Polycandrioti et Cécile B. Vigouroux, ainsi que Marie-Jeanne Barrier, Marie-Thérèse Cerf, Pascale Hurtado, Aspasia Nanaki et Jana Diklic pour leur collaboration.

Tous droits réservés pour tous pays.

ÉDITO

Monica Dietl | Directrice de l'association COST et membre du Conseil d'administration du RFIEA

Les instituts d'études avancées français sont des lieux d'échange propices à la créativité des chercheurs du monde entier qui y sont accueillis, chacun poursuivant une politique scientifique propre en partie déterminée par sa situation locale et sa genèse historique. Réunis au sein d'un réseau, le RFIEA, les IEA offrent à la France une plateforme collaborative spécifique dans des disciplines les plus diverses et lui procurent une visibilité qui rendent la France bien plus attractive pour les chercheurs du monde entier. Reliés à d'autres IEA en Europe, ils forment un formidable réservoir d'expertise et de savoirs qui couvre tous les champs des sciences humaines et sociales.

Pour autant, les SHS souffrent d'un manque de reconnaissance, quand elles ne se voient pas retirer même jusqu'à leur scientificité. Or, par la diversité des sujets abordés au cours des résidences de chercheurs, les IEA démontrent la vitalité et la nécessité des SHS : des mathématiques à l'économie, de l'anthropologie à l'archéologie, la sociologie et la psychologie, sans oublier l'histoire et la culture, les SHS s'occupent fondamentalement de la diversité humaine.

Les recherches et l'avancement des connaissances dans ces disciplines sont indispensables à nos sociétés d'aujourd'hui : leurs résultats doivent guider les choix des citoyens comme des politiques à un moment où une grave crise traverse l'Europe et le monde. Les conditions d'accueil des IEA permettent justement aux chercheurs de poursuivre des recherches au long cours, sans contrainte administrative ou budgétaire, au sein d'une communauté scientifique pluridisciplinaire, afin d'accéder à une meilleure compréhension des problèmes scientifiques posées et de faire éclore de nouvelles idées.

Outre les IEA, il existe en Europe un autre espace de liberté permettant la création de plateformes d'échanges : l'*Intergovernamental European framework for COoperation in Science and Technology*, autrement appelé COST, dont je suis la directrice. Depuis sa création en 1971 par 19 pays visionnaires, COST offre aux chercheurs de toutes disciplines un espace de liberté nécessaire au dialogue, aux recherches avancées, à la création et à l'utilisation d'idées dans dans tous les domaines de la science et de la technologie. Les sciences humaines et sociales y occupent une place prépondérante, et les projets couvrent des sujets aussi divers que la littérature, le multilinguisme, la mémoire transculturelle, l'éthique en cas de catastrophes, l'adaptation des systèmes de santé européens à la diversité, la recherche sur les conflits, l'architecture ou les droits de l'homme… La mission principale de COST est de favoriser l'innovation scientifique menant à de nouveaux concepts et produits, afin de contribuer à renforcer les capacités de recherche et d'innovation européenne.

COST poursuit trois objectifs majeurs : (i) utiliser l'immense potentiel de l'Europe en reliant les communautés scientifiques de haut niveau sur le continent et de l'ouvrir au monde, (ii) offrir des possibilités de mise en réseaux pour les chercheurs en début de carrière et (iii) accroître l'impact de la recherche sur les décideurs locaux, nationaux et européens, les organismes de réglementation ainsi que sur le secteur privé à l'échelle du continent. Son esprit est résolument pan-Européen puisque 36[1] pays participent à son activité. COST offre ainsi à l'Europe un lieu de dialogue et de confiance avec une approche très simple, qui est de laisser les chercheurs se rencontrer, se connaître, se réunir, et d'élaborer un langage commun permettant une mutuelle compréhension propice à l'avancement des idées et des connaissances. La dimension internationale s'impose tout naturellement, et l'attractivité de l'Europe et de chacun de ses pays s'établit sans difficulté ni entrave.

À l'instar de COST, les IEA démontrent également que l'espace et les principes qu'ils proposent intéressent les chercheurs du monde entier, car les sujets tels qu'ils y sont traités, les cultures des lieux où ils sont situés, les environnements scientifiques stimulants qu'ils offrent sont une opportunité unique pour chaque chercheur de se poser pendant un temps défini et de travailler sereinement à la rencontre d'autres esprits. De manière marginale mais non moins nécessaire, on y apprend la générosité, la tolérance et l'entente mutuelle, valeurs également essentielles à l'évolution de notre monde…

1. 35 Pays membres et un état coopératif

SCIENCE, PROBLEM SOLVING AND BIBLIOMETRICS[1]

Giuseppe Longo | résident à l'IEA de Nantes

En 1971, Giuseppe Longo a soutenu une thèse de mathématiques à l'université de Pise portant sur la complexité du calcul des fonctions récursives. Jusqu'en 1990, il a été enseignant-chercheur dans cette université. Il est ensuite devenu directeur de recherche au CNRS, affecté au laboratoire d'informatique de l'ENS. Les recherches de Giuseppe Longo portent sur la logique mathématique, la théorie de la récursion, la sémantique dénotationnelle, le lambda-calcul, la théorie des types, la théorie des catégories et leurs applications aux langages fonctionnels.



Giuseppe Longo, 2013 © Christophe Delory

PROBLEMS AND THEORIES

The head of a prestigious scientific institution recently said, by paraphrasing a famous quotation: "we solve problems that are posed, not that we pose". This view totally misses the history and role of human knowledge construction and prepares wrong ways for evaluating it.

Science is not problem solving, it is theory building. Any relevant, difficult problem requires the construction of a new theoretical frame to deal with the problem in an original and effective way. Moreover, problems follow from the proposal of a theory.

Animals continually solve problems that are posed to them by events. We, the humans, by language, in our communicating community, we looked at the Moon, at the Stars, which pose no problem, and invented Myths and Theories, and derived from them countless problems. We also looked at inert matter, a stone, some sand on a Greek beach, and proposed the atomistic theory. Science originated by these attempts to organize the world by concepts and theories. Later, it was radically renewed by looking again at planets, but from a different perspective: from the point of view of the Sun, on the grounds of a different metaphysics, which lead to a theoretical revolution. It was also renewed by looking at two falling stones in an original way and at physical trajectories as inertial, at the infinite limit of a non-existing frictionless movement.

As a matter of fact, science is not the progressive occupation of reality by known tools, it is instead the definition of the very objects of knowledge, the construction of new perspectives and of new conceptual frames. Problems follow from these active constructions of knowledge, interact with it. Relevant problems, posed within a given theory, require a new insight, a change of perspective, often a new theory. And in the history of science, theories can be hardly distinguished from philosophical thinking. This may be implicit, but further novelties and critical reflections are enhanced by explicit philosophical frames, sometimes also in interaction with the arts and their proper knowledge content and expression (Weyl, 1952; Angelini, Lupacchini, 2013; Longo, 2011). This interplay is at the core of the history of mathematics, physics, biology; it reached a very high intensity in some of the most productive moments of our cultural and scientific invention, the VI-IV centuries BC in Greece, the Renaissance and during the decades of formation of XXth-century mathematics, physics and biology, bridging the last two centuries.

In contrast to this, one prominent physicist stated once that "the philosophy of science is about as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds". And birds are very good at solving their problems. Yet, can one set apart the scientific work by Darwin, Riemann, Poincaré, Bohr, Einstein, Schrödinger… from their philosophy of knowledge and of science? As a matter of fact, in the mind of most managers of science, this critique of philosophy covers also the theoretical aspects of science, as they always border each other. So, government's policies in financing science must be justified by their role in solving the country's problems and by their accountable economic fall-out—stated the French Cour des Comptes (the constitutional Accounting Agency) a few years ago. In either case, science, with no philosophy, is viewed as applied problem solving, with immediate or short term economic results. This misses the actual role and history of culture and science, which radically modified the human condition. Science and culture crucially contributed, often by "enabling" in a highly unpredictable way and in changing economic and social contexts, the dynamics of our societies.

Going back to birds, ornithology is the science of bird life and evolution; it is then analog to knowledge and reflections on human condition and history. Then, the difference between birds and humans is exactly that birds do not have ornithology, while we have "humanology", that is humanities and a theory of human evolution (or natural sciences, more generally)

BIBLIOMETRICS AND DEMOCRACY

Managers continually solve problems that are posed to them, of any kind. They have a general training that teaches them how to solve problems in any context, by referring to a unique, universal theory: the "common sense" theory.

Today, managers stepped into science by solving a fundamental problem: how to evaluate science? how to finance it? So they used the common sense theory: by asking the vote of the majority of scientists, in each discipline. This vote is expressed by the number of quotations and by the impact factors of journals, based on the (average) number of quotations in the two years following publication. Isn't this a undebatable and effective use of democracy? Since this poll, in comparative evaluations, is directly and indirectly expressed by counting quotations, it is, allegedly, a rigorous, expression of a majority consensus on scientific content. It is objective.

Now, democracy is grounded on two fundamental principles: the government by a majority and the possibility for a minority to propose alternative policies, to explore new or different ways of being together.

The formation of scientific thinking is a delicate process. Science is the interplay between these two fundamental aspects of democracy. When some major theory becomes common sense, then the novelty will pop out against this common sense framework, by a disagreement with the main frame theory. This has been so since the formation of Greek science, then with the modern scientific revolution and further on with the XXth-century radical changes of perspective, in Physics, Mathematics, Biology. The formation of scientific knowledge is always against 'common sense' (Bachelard, 1940).

Also in everyday work and in relation to existing theories, a scientific thinker always starts by an "unsatisfaction". In mathematics, say, facing a problem, the relevant solution comes from saying first: the mathematical structures that are currently used for this or that are not the good ones, this is not the right theoretical approach, these are not the right tools… Then, the mathematician looks at matters from a, maybe slightly, but different perspective, in a new frame. Unsatisfaction helps in "making a step aside", reflecting critically on the current approaches, inventing new mathematical structures, maybe by minor variants of existing ones.

Critical thinking is at the core of scientific theoretizing: one has to step aside and look at the very principles of knowledge construction, as grounding the dominating way of thinking. And change fuels the history of science. We have to be constantly mobile, plastic, adaptive, able to get away from the dominating frame. But also an engineer, who has had a good theoretical and critical training, may face a technical problem posed to him/her, by proposing a new point a view, by approaching it in a new way, away from the intended applied frame or theory and, by this, he/she may invent an unexpected solution. On the theoretical side, a way for enhancing a critique of leading knowledge principles and exploring new scientific perspectives, may be obtained by crossing boundaries, comparing foundations and by an explicit philosophical commitment in natural sciences (Bailly, Longo, 2011; Longo, Montévil, 2013).

Critical thinking is the fundamental component of minority thinking: it implies disagreement with respect to the mainframe theory, the common sense theory. This forces science to relate to democracy by relying first on the minority side, by the proposal of new ways of understanding, of acting, of moving ahead. And this is so also in the ordinary research activity, possibly by minor changes of perspective; otherwise it is not scientific research. Sometimes, rarely, changes are revolutionary; always, they enrich knowledge and prepare revolutions.

Of course, one may work in the "majority theory", but the novelty, the new idea, even within that theory, will always require a change of insight that will bring the proponent on a critical side, possibly a new minority side, more or less away from the main frame. History of science teaches us that the opinion of the majority has always been on the wrong side, at each moment of the formation of new scientific thinking. One does not need to refer only to the most quoted turning points, such as the modern scientific revolution, as it was so also for the early approaches to biological evolution (Buffon, Lamarck), or for differential geometry and the various branches of physics invented in the XIXth century (thermodynamics, electromagnetism, statistical physics). Gauss was "scared" to present his ideas on non-euclidean geometry and did not make them public for decades. Riemann and Helmholtz were litterally insulted by award winner E. Dühring, elected by influential majorities in 1872, about 20 years after Riemann's fundamental writings on differential geometry. Poincaré's geometry of non-linear systems was largely ignored for about 60 years, till the 1950s, when theories of deterministic chaos were brought to the limelight by Kolmogorof and Lorentz. Some work I recently studied, Turing's

seminal paper on morphogenesis (1952), had little or no followers for about 20 years! An early revitalization can be found in (Fox-Keller, Segel, 1970).

These are not exceptions: this is how scientific thought is formed. The exception is when an innovative theory is quickly accepted: Einstein's Relativity is probably the unique case of a rapid success and diffusion of a novel approach. I am not expressing by this the romantic myth of the isolated, revolutionary scientist. These revolutions or novelties are always made possible by and within strong scientific schools. The modern scientific revolution matured in the intellectually very lively context of Italian Renaissance. It crossed the invention of the perspective in painting, a new organization of human space, including, later, the spaces of astronomy (van Fraassen, 1970; Angelini, Lupacchini, 2013; Longo, 2011). Naturalism originated then by a new way of looking at phenomena and at our humanity, by inventing a new metaphysics, from Leonardo's drawings to Nicolas Cusanus's proposal of an "infinite universe" (Zellini, 2005). These processes always required a change of viewpoint, with respect to the official theory, also within an excellent school, yet against that very school.

Galileo, in his youth, worked on the "physics of Hell", (Galilei, 1588), a possible path towards the "naturalization" of a religious ontology and, by this, of knowledge. As a matter of fact, a common fashion, in the XVIth century, was, for excellent physicists and mathematicians, the heirs of Pacioli, Cardano and Bombelli, to solve the many problems posed by the material structure of Hell. Galileo turned one of these problems into a seminal theory, that is into science.[2]

This juvenile work gave Galileo a sufficient bibliometric index to get tenure in Pisa in 1589, when he stopped working on the Hell and, some time later, got in touch with Kepler. Tenure is fundamental to allow free thinking, even though, in some historical contexts, it may be insufficient to protect this freedom, when the novel theoretical proposal is too audacious, too much against the main stream - and minority thinking, thus scientific thinking, is not allowed to go beyond certain metaphysical or political limits.

In this case and in all the others I mentioned above, the new theoretical frame does emerge within a strong scientific school and a relatively free debate - it is allowed to emerge as long as the novelty does not contradict a dominating metaphysics. Yet, even within a school, the further change is due to a few who dare to go further, or, more precisely, to think differently. It is the school that produces the possibility of thinking deeply and differently; it is not a matter of isolated individualities.

We have to promote schools, but their strength will reside also or mostly in the amount of freedom they allow to sidetrack approaches. No one could think freely in Soviet Union, except in Mathematics and in Theoretical Physics (but not in Biology) within the Academy of Sciences. And remarkable and original work, in Mathematics and Physics, was produced in that singular context. Some, local, space of dissent may suffice for science, if circumstances allow (for example, the social privileges accorded to scientists in the Soviet Union-SU). But dissent is needed for science.

Bibliometrics is the apparently "democratic" analog of the Church's dominating metaphysics in the XVIIth century or the Party's truth in the SU. These rulers were not elected, but other majority rulers were elected, such as Hitler or Salazar. It suffices then to kill the opposing ideas and democracy looses its meaning - and science disappears, like in Germany after 1933. The majority vote, *per se*, is not democracy. Democracy requires also and crucially the enablement or even the promotion of a thinking and active minority. Bibliometrics forbids minority thinking, where new scientific ideas always occur by definition, as history teaches us. If a scientist has to write on top of his/her CV his/her bibliometric indices, that is the evaluation by the majority of scientists of his/her work, and present it in all occasions, this will prevent the search for a different approach, to dare to explore a new path that may require 60, 20 or 10 years to be quoted, as in the examples I gave above. And he/she is constantly pushed to develop as much as possible technical tools in a familiar and well established theoretical frame, as they may allow others to write more papers, where the technique may be quoted.

We all need to be evaluated in science and severely so. But a new idea, an apparently absurd exploration may be accepted by a majority of two or three in a committee of three or five colleagues giving tenure. The success may require several applications, but the candidate with too original ideas may finally encounter a small group of open minded colleagues, who do not look a priori at the bibliometric index, but dare to understand and evaluate contents. This also applies to publishing in good journals. If the editor does not care of the expected impact factor of the journal (a "next two years" quotation criterion!), but is able to find open minded referees, an apparently strange, non-sense or non-common sense idea may find its way to publication. So, after six or more attempts, even the 1971 seminal paper by Ruelle and Takens on chaotic dynamics could find a publisher, and, after several years of failures, in the 1990s, Gallese's, Rizzolati's and collaborators' unexpected results on "Mirror Neurons" were at last published (see references)[3]. Both papers were too original to be immediately accepted, yet a couple of audacious editors finally dared to publish them.

If, instead, each evaluation refers to a "global" majority vote, that is to the opinion expressed by the largest number of quotations or expected quotations (the short term impact factor) by all scientists in the discipline on Earth, science is at the end. Or we will have a new form of techno-science, the one managers can easily judge and finance: short term problem solving and techniques within clearly established frames, the problems that the majority in a discipline can easily understand, that even managers can grasp. But no radically new theory will ever pose its own, internal problems that cannot even be seen from the dominating perspective.

NETWORKS, DIVERSITY AND "THE NORM"

Computer networks give us a tool comparable to writing, another of our extraordinary inventions. They were both motivated by metaphysics and philosophy. In Mesopotamia, five thousands years ago, humans made visible the invisible, language and thought, in a dialogue with the Gods, (Herrenschmidt, 2007). The human interaction was suddenly enriched by this new tool and by the magic of the permanent sign, thus the explicitly symbolic transmission of myths, history and knowledge. A new form of exchange modified our communicating community.

In the last century, Hilbert's philosophical questions, originating from his theory on the Foundations of Mathematics, were answered by Gödel, Church, Kleene and Turing by proposing Computability Theory and abstract Logical Computing Machines (Turing). Later, our interacting humanity connected concrete computing machines in networks and started a search

for suitable theories of this new level of communication. Networks, today's computer networks in particular, allow mankind to access knowledge and memory of mankind, an extraordinary enhancement of our interactive thinking. We can



access to diversity, collaborate at distance, appreciate differences, enrich cultures by endless hybridisations.

Yet, these networks may also be used also for "normalizing" humanity. They may be used for averaging everybody. Just force a unique criterion for "excellence"; replace the network structure by a totally ordered line of values, a uniform scale of points, the same for everybody. Then the networks' richness in confronting diversity may be used to forbid the variance from the imposed norm. Transform the network of exchange of University or of researchers into a total order, on the grounds of a few (often perfectly stupid or managerial) criteria, and diversity is lost.

Hybridisation and contaminations are at the origin of most novelties in evolution, both biological and human or cultural evolution. But no hybridisation nor contamination is possible in absence of diversity, including the "hopeful monsters", the wrong paths continually explored by phylogenesis, (Goldschmidt, 1940; Gould, 1989). We have to accommodate errors, wrong paths, if we want diversity and, by it and within it, the novelty of science.

Self-appointed agencies of managers propose criteria and technical tools for averaging the world of knowledge, to normalize thinking according to common sense values. We should oppose to this unique scale of values some sort of "index of diversity". They are already used by biologists to assess the dynamics of an ecosystem: when diversity decreases, the situation in general worsens, major extinctions happen or are expected. Diversity guarantees the ever changing dynamics that is essential to life and to human cultures. By normalizing evaluations, forcing identity of aims, of metrics and, thus, of cultural contents, we are killing the permanent "variations on themes" as well as the radical changes in perspective that constitute the ever changing path of scientific knowledge.

Networks allow collaborations, today as never before. Yet, they may be used to force mainly competition on the grounds of fixed values and observables, by accounting criteria with no content. Competition is much easier, in science, than collaboration. It may even be based on cheating, on announcing false results, declaring non existing experimental protocols, on stealing results, organizing networks of reciprocal, yet fake quotations. Collaboration instead is very hard: good scientists are very selective in accepting collaborators and diversity makes the dialogue difficult, while producing the most relevant novelties. A research activity mainly based on competing for projects and prizes, on competitive evaluations, destroys the chances for open collaborations, closes the mind to the others. Occasionally, we may need to compete for a job, a grant. The point is to avoid turning this inevitable fact of life into the main attitude in scientific work, that is to make competition and normalizing evaluations the driving force and the guidelines of our scientific activity, which instead should be based on collaborating diversities.

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1. *Invited Lecture*, Academia Europaea Conference on "Use and Abuse of Bibliometrics", Stockholm, May 2013. Proceedings, Wim Blockmans et al. (eds), Portland Press, 2014.

2. Hell is a cone of a 60° base angle, whose vertex is at the center of the Earth. This poses a major challenge, dear to the Church's and Universities' managers of the time, who wanted scientists to solve problems and claimed to be opened to the new sciences: how thick must be the Earth's arch covering the Hell as a dome? In order to obtain an estimate of this value, Galileo referred to the structural properties of Brunelleschi's dome of Santa Maria del Fiore. But he did not use its ratio of sizes, instead he made an original computation with an intuition of scaling effects: while he obtains, as for the thickness of the Hell's roof, one height of the Earth radius, he observes that a small dome of 30 "braccia" (arm length) may need only one or even one-half braccia, (Galilei, 1588). Galileo was also puzzled by the scaling of the Devil, a further challenge – she is 1,200 meters tall, with the same proportions of a human – impossible (see (Lévy-Leblond, 2006 and 2008) for a historical discussion and a possible solution for the now widely accepted "Devil's violation of scaling equations"). This problem opened the way to Galileo's seminal work on scaling and its fundamental equations, 50 years later, which extends also to biology: the section of bones gives their strength, it must thus grow like the cube of their length, not as the square, since the animal's weight grows like the cube (Galilei, 1638; Longo, Montévil, 2013, chapter 2). The paths of knowledge construction are unpredictable and may even pass through the Hell, (Lévy-Leblond, 2008), if a scientist is allowed to think theoretically and with sufficient freedom, that is to deal with a problem by theory building, in full scientific generality.

3. David Ruelle mentioned this story in several lectures; Gallese's personal communication.

4. (see also http://www.di.ens.fr/users/longo)

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WHAT THE SCIENCE OF MORALITY DOESN'T SAY ABOUT

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I

In recent years scientists have devoted increasing efforts to the study of morality. As neuroscientist Moll and his colleagues (2003, p. 299) say, "morality has been at the center of informal talks and metaphysical discussions since the beginning of history. Recently, converging lines of evidence from evolutionary biology, neuroscience and experimental psychology have shown that morality is grounded in the brain." In this article I ask what exactly this new science of morality can and can't claim to have discovered about morality; what it can and can't tell us about morality on the basis of the work it has done. I argue that the object of study of much recent work is not morality, but a particular kind of individual moral judgment. Most data and analyses are about something very specific: an individual's judgment about the rightness, appropriateness, or permissibility of an action, made in response to a stimulus at a particular point in time. But this is a small and peculiar sample of morality, whose incidence in people's actual moral lives is uncertain. There are many things that are moral, yet not moral judgments. There are also many things that are moral judgments, yet not of that particular kind. If moral things are various and diverse, then empirical research about one kind of individual moral judgment doesn't warrant theoretical conclusions about morality in general—i.e., morality's nature, functioning, origins, causes, or effects. If that kind of individual moral judgment is a peculiar and rare thing, then it is not obvious what it tells us about other moral things. What is more, it is not obvious what its theoretical importance is to begin with—i.e., why we should care about it at all.

Thus, my arguments raise questions about the theoretical meaning and value of research about individual moral judgment. My claim is not that the numerous new experimental findings about this object will necessarily turn out to be inconsequential or useless—that we can't know at this point. But at present it's not very clear what larger conclusions follow from them, nor what their implications for a scientific theory of morality are, much less what their practical or policy implications might be (if any). In this respect, the literature is rife with questionable claims and non sequiturs. Indeed, several recent papers seem unaware of the crucial distinction between individual moral judgment and morality, or contain problematic argumentative transitions from moral judgment to the ambiguous "moral decision-making."

In what follows, I begin by identifying what I call "moral judgment-centric approaches" (MJA), i.e., research approaches that have individual moral judgment (MJ) at their methodological center. Then, I spell out my claim that MJ is a peculiar moral thing and there's much moral life beyond it. Last, I argue for a pluralism of methods and objects of inquiry in the scientific investigation of morality, so that it transcends its problematic overemphasis on a particular kind of individual moral judgment.

II

Scientists of morality have done a great deal of research that revolves around individuals making moral judgments. Subjects may be in the lab, inside the scanner, or at home on their computer. In most studies they are healthy (or "normal") persons, but in some they have brain damage or a psychiatric condition. In a few studies their brain's activity or chemistry has been manipulated, but in most it hasn't. The subjects' task is to make a moral judgment about statements or situations they are presented with. Oftentimes these studies elicit judgments specifically about moral dilemmas. That is, subjects are presented with a situation where two or more courses of action are possible, or, more often, a situation where the two alternatives are doing a certain thing or abstaining from doing it. Then subjects are asked questions such as: Would it be permissible for person A to do action X in situation S1?; Would it be okay for you to do Y in S2?; or something along these lines. These answers are their moral judgments. For example, "It is not permissible for A to do X in S1," is a subject's moral judgment.

The most famous of these moral dilemmas is the "trolley problem," originally crafted by philosopher Philippa Foot (2002). But psychologists and neuroscientists have conducted experiments using many other dilemmas, some of which they drew from the ethics literature, and some of which they expressly designed to manipulate variables of interest. For instance, Judith Thomson's "loop" and "fat man" variants on the trolley problem; more recent reformulations by Marc Hauser and John Mikhail; Joshua Greene's "crying baby" and "infanticide" dilemmas; in earlier moral psychology Kohlberg's "Heinz dilemma" and "the captain's dilemma"; and Jonathan Haidt's ingenious cases (although not dilemmas) about sex among siblings, eating one's dog, or wiping the toilet with a national flag.

The research questions that these studies have sought to address are diverse, but some of the main ones are as follows. What brain areas are "activated", "recruited," "implicated," "responsible for," or "associated with" making moral judgments? What brain areas or circuits "subserve" particular kinds of moral judgments (e.g., deontological and consequentialist ones)? What are the neural "correlates," "basis," "foundations," "underpinnings," or "substrates" of moral judgment, decision-making, and emotions? What are the specific functional roles of specific brain areas? What causes individuals' moral judgments: hot intuition, affect, and emotion, or rather cold reason and reasoning? Is there a moral faculty, organ, or universal grammar, comparable to the language faculty, organ, or universal grammar?

What is common to most of these research projects, though, is that individual moral judgment (MJ) is at their methodological center. What subjects do is to make moral judgments. What researchers account for, predict, and find neural correlates of are moral judgments. Indeed, the focus is not just on moral judgment, but on a specific kind of moral judgment. Its prototypical features as found in this literature are:

- a moral judgment is made by and is an attribute of one individual
- it's made in response to a specific stimulus
- the stimulus is an imaginary situation and a question about it
- the judgment is about an action (rather than, say, a person or state of affairs)
- a moral judgment is a statement (indicative mood)
- it is in essence an utterance or speech act (even if not in fact uttered)
- it makes use of "thin" ethical concepts only (okay, appropriate, permissible, acceptable, wrong, etc.)
- it's fixed, settled, verdict-like
- it's clear (not conceptually or semantically muddled, incoherent, etc.)
- it's made at a specific, precise, discrete point in time

I argue that MJ is a peculiar kind of moral thing, hence not a good sample of moral things. It's one among the many moral things that are part of people's moral lives. I further argue that there's no reason to suppose that all of the members of the moral class work the same way. It follows that investigations about MJ—what I call "moral judgment-centric approaches" (MJA)—don't have the resources to make claims about the nature and functioning of morality as a whole. Evidently, what is and isn't part of people's moral lives is an empirical question, not an armchair one. Further, it can't be answered unless you specify just what persons, because this seems to vary from society to society, as well as historical period, social class, age, gender, and many other variables. It's also an empirical question whether, given a group of people, MJ is a relatively small part of their lives, or rather is a large or the largest one. My aim here is simply to make some suggestions as to what other moral things there might be besides MJ. Future work—both empirical investigations and retrospective reviews—should put my suggestions to test, and specify where, to whom, and to what extent they apply (if at all). At this stage, plausibility is their main test.

So, what else might there be? Two kinds of things: (i) things that are moral, or reasonably called "moral," yet not moral judgments; and (ii) things that are moral judgments, yet not of the particular MJ kind—i.e., they don't meet one or more of the above conditions. In the next section I suggest some distinctions that compare and contrast the MJA picture with what it leaves out of sight. Even before the empirical evidence comes in, I believe that leaving these things out of morality by fiat, without a convincing argument, is unacceptable. But this is precisely what MJA have done.

III

In the recent empirical work, MJ is conceived of as a declarative sentence. I argue that moral questions and exhortations are different from judgments in theoretically important respects. Consider these three types of sentences: (i) Declarative: It is morally permissible/right for A to Φ; (ii) Interrogative: Is it morally permissible/right for A to Φ? / What ought A to do, morally speaking?; (iii) Imperative: Φ! / You must/ought to Φ! Not only is MJ conceived of as a declarative sentence in the indicative mood, such as sentences of type (i). I think it's also assumed that moral judgments are in essence utterances or speech acts. Even if in practice subjects check boxes, push buttons, or left-click, they would be prepared to utter something like (i) under the appropriate speech-act conditions.

I argue that, besides judgments, one component of people's moral lives may be questions, including but not limited to questions such as (ii). These questions people pose to and about other people in ordinary conversations and personal ruminations, and, perhaps more importantly, to and about themselves. Moral questions may or may not lead to answers, such as the MJ that the experimenter's or survey researcher's question leads to. Sometimes they may remain unanswered, yet still function as tentative guides to thought and action, because they suggest what's important, worrisome, worth thinking about. Or they may remain unanswered without really guiding anything—just obstinately live on in one's mind. Phenomenologically, the experience of having or posing or struggling with a moral question is arguably a distinct one, and surely much unlike uttering a moral judgment. Thus, moral questions are a distinct kind of moral phenomenon, worth attending to in and of themselves. Consider a few more concrete examples. Should I regularly give money to charity? Why would I not eat meat if I like it? Why would someone who likes eating meat not eat it? Is it wrong for me to have an abortion? Is she a good spouse? Why am I doing what I'm doing with my life? What's really important to me? Is life fair to me? Is he such-and-such kind of person?

Moral exhortations—sentences (iii) above—seem to be yet another kind of empirical phenomenon and work in yet another way. Your saying to your friend, "Don't lie to your spouse!," is presumably based on

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a judgment, belief, conviction, or feeling to the effect that it'd be morally wrong or bad for her to lie to him (for the sake of the argument, I set aside non-moral reasons she might have). Besides exhortations, there's also what one might call self-exhortations—e.g., "Let me improve this aspect of my life!," or "I really shouldn't do that thing anymore!" They, too, are presumably based on some sort of judgment to the effect that that is a morally bad thing to have or do. However, neither exhortations nor self-exhortations seem reducible to or understandable in terms of the judgments that apparently underlie them. For one, as empirical phenomena, exhortations and judgments don't look alike at all. Nor does the first-person experience, phenomenologically speaking. Conceptually, they have a different aim, job, or point; assuming speech, a different speech act. Although exhortations implicitly or explicitly contain theoretical evaluations, their point is practical in a straightforward and unmediated manner: they try to bring about a specific thing. Morality—however defined or understood—seems to have to do primarily with practice and action, and only secondarily or derivatively with theory about practice and action (more on this below). In this respect, exhortations fare better than judgments, whose practical aim is less direct. Why are moral judgments but not exhortations empirically studied?

Finally, there are narratives. As extensive literatures in sociology, psychology, anthropology, history, and communication have shown, human beings are narrative creatures. People tell stories about themselves and about others, about their lives and identities, about their community, its past and its origins. For our purposes, it's important that narratives can't be decomposed or analyzed into a set of judgments, rules, points, arguments, questions, or thoughts. A narrative's meaning is tied to its unity. The meaning of one part depends on its relationship to the meaning of other parts—much like indexicals, networks, and relational properties in general. Some particular types of narratives, such as fables, conclude with a moral or a rule of conduct. Yet, again, it's unclear what the moral's meaning would be, were its narrative context to disappear, and thus the moral remained as a self-standing sentence. Along these lines, you could argue that all real-life moral judgments are embedded in a narrative context—isolated moral judgments never occur, or even aren't possible at all. Similarly, you could raise these empirical questions about people's moral lives: Do they go about making independent judgments about things, one after the other? Or, rather, do they go about concocting and telling stories and bits of stories, to make sense of things and weave them together, and in the context of which they morally evaluate things?

IV

I'd like now to consider what MJA might be neglecting in light of three traditional distinctions in moral philosophy: (i) the right v. the good v. the virtuous; (ii) permissible v. obligatory v. supererogatory; and (iii) ethics of doing v. ethics of being. As mentioned above, MJ are about what it'd be "okay," "appropriate," "wrong," "morally wrong," "permissible," "morally permissible," or "morally acceptable" for someone to do. These are the concepts that the experimental tasks employ. All of these questions try to get at some undoubtedly relevant moral things: rightness, acceptability, permissibility, "okayness," etc. Yet, might they all be missing some other relevant moral things? Perhaps in some societies questions about wrongness and permissibility are prominent in some people's moral lives. The practical significance of the concepts of rightness, wrongness, permissibility, and impermissibility in contemporary Western societies is evident, for example, in their ubiquitous institutional and cultural incarnations. Besides, as a matter of fact, these concepts have had an elective affinity with a particular form: rules or law-like principles.

However, there is a different sort of moral relationship that people can have to things—viz., finding them not morally right but morally good, either in themselves, or as means to further moral ends. You can say that people are after these moral goods, even when they lack a plan as to how to get them and this is a matter of practical sense. These are things that someone may hold dear; they aren't her mere desires and preferences, but things she finds worthy of being had, desired, preferred, sought, cherished, or chosen. People seem to have moral projects, hopes, aspirations, ideals, and commitments, where goods and "the good" play the key role. Some examples of goods of diverse types are: liberty, truth, knowledge, community, solidarity, faith, health, wealth, honor, pleasure, excellence, love, family, friendship, security, ataraxia, work, self-expression. Further, there is a plurality of goods and of conceptions of the good, even within a single moral community, which at times are incommensurable. Moreover, besides doing what's right and avoiding what's wrong, people may wish to live a good, fulfilling, life; live it well, not misspend it. Some people might even have one project or commitment that is the most important of all. For example: have a family, write a novel, become rich, help the

poor, find God, fight against evil, reach a state of contentment and serenity, or bring about the revolution. None of these things are encompassed by the concepts of rightness and permissibility; MJA are blind to them.

Nor do these concepts encompass the moral relationship of admiration, and the class of acts known as supererogatory. When presented with morally extraordinary people, acts, or states of affairs, people may feel or express admiration. Consider the lives of the saints and the heroes. Their acts are obviously permissible and obviously not obligatory. But that doesn't help us describe and account for how people seem to react and relate to them. The same can be said about abhorrent, abominable, and despicable acts and people. The experience and social consequences of the morally admirable/heroic and despicable/monstrous don't seem understandable in the same terms as the good/bad, much less the right/wrong. They are not quantitatively more intense, but qualitatively different.

I've suggested that MJA miss the good and the supererogatory completely or almost completely. I believe it doesn't cover, either, people's judgments about character, virtue, and, more generally, what some ethicists call "ethics of being." It seems that sometimes people's moral judgments, questions, and experiences are not about what to do, but about what or how to be. Someone may be referred to as a bad, good, self-absorbed, vain, generous, fair, open-minded, or irresponsible person. Or as someone who has guts, or is depraved, or sly, or manipulative, which in turn may become reasons for action (e.g., "I decided not to engage in business with Jones, because he's an irresponsible fellow"; or, "Try to help him if you can—he's a good man"). Interestingly, these judgments about being are presumably based, inductively, on individual instances of doing. But they are nonetheless not reducible to them. Moreover, there is a sort of stickiness to judgments about being or character, precisely because they are seen as referring to relatively stable traits or dispositions. Indeed, a judgment about how someone is might shape future instances of judgment about what they do. In addition, moral judgments and questions about yourself, and moral exhortations to yourself, may come in the language of being and character, not in the language of doing. You may hope and strive to be an honest, courageous, pious, or respectful person, without it being possible to translate this into a set of concrete and exhaustive judgments, principles, or action-maxims. Your moral self-conception or identity—what kind of person you see yourself as, what kind of person you hope to become, who are your moral heroes and antiheroes—is missed by talk about right, wrong, permissible, and forbidden, which is what MJA investigate.

Furthermore, you may be unable (or unwilling) to bracket the fact that moral life and moral action are (1) the moral life and moral action of particular people, which (2) necessarily take place within a context. As it's been often observed, agent-neutral ethical theories such as utilitarianism fail to take this into account. So does a methodological approach such as MJA. To return to the example of the trolley-problem experiments, without any (social, cultural, religious, legal) context, it might be hard for subjects to decide what the right thing to do is, or even to find the question meaningful and see its point at all. "Well, it really, really depends," they may think to themselves. In addition, subjects may wonder whether the fat man to be sacrificed for the greatest good of the greatest number is an HIV/AIDS researcher who may discover a cure for it, or a ruthless Uruguayan dictator. Not being analytic philosophers, subjects may ask themselves: what in the world does it mean that he is nobody in particular—neither a medical researcher nor a dictator, neither kind nor unkind, neither old nor young?

I've been making some empirical conjectures about ordinary people's moral lives, and specifically whether MJA may be missing some of its components. I have not been talking about the academic field of moral philosophy and its normative and metaethical debates. Yet, many of my points have mutatis mutandis a counterpart in moral philosophy. For instance, if the good ought to have priority over the right, if the "law conception of ethics" is misguided, if Kantians can accommodate the concept of the supererogatory, if utilitarians can accommodate the concepts of identity and integrity. More precisely, many of my points have a counterpart in several strands of criticisms leveled at mainstream analytic ethics. This is not a mere coincidence. For MJA's conception of morality heavily draws on the particular conception of morality that consequentialism and deontology share, yet which is not shared by other traditions. For instance, a pragmatist, existentialist, communitarian, particularist, Buddhist, or virtue ethicist would probably see the disputes between consequentialism and deontology as pointless. Today's scientists of morality have framed their question and modeled their object of inquiry after these two schools, thereby unwittingly taking sides on a substantive issue in ethics.

I argue that the object of study of much recent work is not morality, but a particular kind of individual moral judgment. But this is a small and peculiar sample of morality. There are many things that are moral, yet not moral judgments. There are also many things that are moral judgments, yet not of that particular kind.

V

In this paper I've asked what moral judgment-centric approaches (MJA) in psychology and neuroscience tell us about morality. I've argued that their object of study, MJ, is not a good sample of moral things. There are many things that are moral, yet not moral judgments. There are also many things that are moral judgments, yet not of the particular MJ kind (as defined above). If these arguments are correct, it follows that MJA research doesn't license theoretical conclusions about morality in general. Rather, it only licenses conclusions about the specific moral object it has actually investigated. To be sure, many suggestive experimental findings about this object have been reported. But I don't think enough thought has been given to what to make of them theoretically, what social phenomena they illuminate, what neural correlates are correlates of, or what to do with these findings to build a satisfactory understanding of morality. To be sure, the new science of morality is still in its infancy. But that doesn't make unwarranted or unclear claims any more acceptable.

Here a pluralist approach would argue that if morality is made up of many different kinds of things, then a compelling science of morality should consider all of them as objects of inquiry, and take them all into account when making claims about what morality is or how morality works. Because they are different kinds of things, they call for different questions and methods. Further, they may yield theoretical claims that aren't subsumable under a single, comprehensive theory of morality, or parsimonious principle about the nature of morality. At least, you shouldn't start with the assumptions that: (a) there is one such theory or principle; and (b) there is a basic micro-unit, common to all moral things.

I think such pluralist view is on the right track. Whatever the theoretical meaning and value of MJA findings turn out to be, they are about and shed light on one particular kind of moral thing. In order to make claims about morality in general, many other objects must be included. And many other methods must be used: psychological and neuroscientific, as well as anthropological, historical, and sociological. For example, for certain research questions there's no way around the ethnographic observation of action and interaction in their natural setting. For certain research questions there's no way around statistically representative surveys of a population. If you intend to use scientific knowledge about morality to make practical recommendations to policy-makers, then an organizational analysis is unavoidable—individual-level differences may be inconsequential or even irrelevant. In some social situations, it's not individuals' automatic intuitions or reactions to stimuli, but deliberation and debate that carry the day regarding what ends up being done and even what ends up being believed and felt by those very individuals. Similarly, if you're interested in moral narratives, you'll have to patiently listen to them or read them, give people some time and freedom to express themselves, and figure out their meanings.

In sum, I believe that there is neither a single best method to study morality, nor a single object of inquiry on the basis of which to make claims about morality. Nor is there a single path toward an understanding or theory of morality. Therefore, a plurality of theoretical and methodological approaches should coexist, each aware of its strengths, but also of its partial perspective and limited scope. In practice, there should be more variation in objects of inquiry and methods. Individual judgment about rightness and wrongness is one among many objects of inquiry scientists of morality need to do research on; so are moral questions, questions about good rather than right, questions about being rather than doing, thick judgments, narratives, institutions, and behavior in natural settings. Neuroimaging and experimental methods are two among many methods scientists of morality need to use; so are surveys, ethnographic observation, and the history of moral concepts and practices.

In these respects, moral psychologists and neuroscientists can benefit from more engagement with historians, anthropologists, and sociologists of morality. Certainly, in one sense it's entirely sensible that there be a division of labor between, say, neuroscience, sociology, and history. However, this division of labor entails two perils. First, it's a consistent historical pattern that scientific disciplines tend to forget the incompleteness of their standpoint and disregard findings that don't fit with their approach. Second, some of the phenomena and processes of interest to a science of morality can't be broken into separate parts—e.g., the social and the neural—because these parts mutually influence or even constitute each other. Hence, studying them separately may lead to misleading results. Unfortunately, a pluralist science of morality entails costs, too. First, its accounts and theories are unlikely to be simple and parsimonious, much like other versions of methodological, explanatory, and ontological pluralism in science. Second, as in politics, this sort of pluralism is time-consuming and hard to realize. For it requires interactions among people who differ not just in the content of their answers, but in the form of the questions they ask, and in the questions they find worth asking to begin with. Yet, just as in politics, this might still be the best way to prevent oversights and build a robust scientific understanding of morality, not just of a particular kind of individual moral judgment.

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF NON-KNOWLEDGE

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Barbara Allen, 2013 © Christophe Delory

Following the Mediterranean coastline driving west out of Marseille about 30km, one reaches the beginning of one of France's largest industrial regions. The Fos-sur-mer/Etang de Berre area is home to almost 430 installations, including: chemical plants, oil refineries, natural gas facilities, and steel production. The Fos-Lavera-Berre chemical park, for example, prides itself in being the largest in southern Europe, producing 40% of all French-produced ethylene and 60% of butadiene not to mention the adjacent oil port, one of the biggest in the world, which supports a local network of refineries. This impressive assemblage of industry belches out tons of toxic air pollutants, causing an eerie yellow-brown veil over the region and the sunsets to be other-worldly, particularly when the mistral winds are still.

The region also has incredible beauty. It extends for more than 50km from the airport at Vitrolles past the picturesque Etang be Berre lagoon to the wetlands of the Camargue, western Europe's largest river delta and home to over 400 species of birds. The inland industrial region extends northward to the Crau, an expansive alluvial fan and important pasture lands for sheep and cattle since ancient times. The area is also home to about 400,000 people living in 30 towns throughout the vast hybrid landscape. What lies beneath this mixture of beauty and dread—the sacred and the profane—is a sense of underlying unease and apprehension about the impact of pollution on human health. It is an awkward mélange of wanting to know, of not wanting to know, of suspecting knowing, but feeling disempowered or afraid to act.

Understanding this public malaise requires understanding the calculus of environmental power in the region: namely who has authority over the land, the air, and the water. In 1965 a law was passed demarcating the coastal part of this region as the Autonomous Port of Marseille now called the Grand Maritime Port of Marseille (GPMM), the largest port in France. Its reach encompasses, not only the actual port of Marseille, but includes the ports and adjacent land extending through Fos-sur-mer all the way to the mouth of the Rhône, including the town of Port-St-Louis. The GPMM designation has had a significant impact on the towns of this region as the law effectively removed all decision-making authority from the citizens and their elected officials and transferred it to the state—specifically the public-private partnership that comprises the GPMM.

In the last 12 years, the two largest controversies over the siting of new hazardous facilities in the region happened in the port town of Fos-sur-mer: 1) the siting of a large Gaz de France LNG terminal on the Fos public beach (opened 2005) and, 2) an incinerator designed to burn all the garbage of Marseille, the second largest city in France (opened 2010). These were hugely unpopular projects in the eyes of the Fos and other nearby residents and served to catalyze the environmental community. On the face of it, the controversies were more about power (or lack thereof) and environmental degradation than about human health. However, the debates did prompt residents to ask questions that were present but not previously vocalized: what were the combination emissions from all the local polluting facilities doing to their health?

To situate the environmental health quest in an illuminating framework, it is helpful to know something about the recently growing research field, the sociology of ignorance, which is also called, the social construction of non-knowledge. Ignorance, is not what is not studied or a byproduct of science—ignorance is actively produced and is shaped by the social, scientific, and political institutions themselves. The study of non-knowledge, therefore, is a view into the values and cultural biases at work in scientific knowledge practices. The ways in which non-knowledge can be actively constructed are many, but in the case of environmental health data, there are two common forms. The first is the production of vast amounts of uninterpreted data presented as an impenetrable wall of numbers, basically insuring the publics' dependence on state experts. Or conversely, the over-aggregation of data that can be used to either, show nothing (i.e. "no effect"), or to argue for continued expert studies until something can be known.

Following are some examples in the case of Fos. In the case of the incinerator siting controversy, the local associations fighting the project were given volumes of technical data about the proposed installation. It was an overwhelming amount of information and it was difficult for the citizens to ascertain exactly what the environmental and health impacts were. Alternatively, data over-aggregation is the norm in the various French agencies and associations tasked with collecting and monitoring health statistics. From cancer to asthma, health statistics are revealed to the public covering such large geographic areas, that it is impossible for a town to know if their health is adversely impacted by their adjacency to polluting industries.

Ignorance is also actively produced through institutional norms, pressures, rules, and logics.[1] Disciplinary cultures have preferences for doing health science certain ways and not others. This can reinforce non-knowledge, but it can also thwart non-traditional ways of doing science to insure that the knowledge remains unknown. One example of the institutional shaping of knowledge gaps is the recent study conducted by the Agence Régionale de Santé (ARS). These scientists were committed to, and had the support of, local environmental activists in trying to answer the industrial zone residents' questions regarding illness in their neighborhoods. The study tracked hospital admittance as the measure to assess the rate of cancer, asthma, and cardiac illness. To understand the prevalence of asthma or the incidence of cancer in a town, hospital admittance is not the best measure because a hospital stay is typically for the most extreme asthma attack or advanced stages of certain cancers. Hospital admission numbers, however, were the data that the ARS scientists could more easily obtain given the fact that public health data on these kinds of illnesses were not readily available. Thus ease of acquisition and cost considerations circumscribed the study that was possible.

In the end, the study showed no higher rates of hospital admission for either asthma or most cancers for residents living in the industrial region. The citizens were unhappy with the study as their primary questions remained unanswered: what are the rates of incidence of illness of those living closest to industry? The scientists explained that they regretted they could not answer the right questions. They explained that the availability of data was the problem. For example, while 13 regions in France have a cancer registry, this region does not. Additionally, while elevated rates of pediatric cancer would be an important indicator of environmental health impacts, this data is only maintained, in aggregate, at the larger regional level. And finally, the state-funded scientists were unable to study auto-immune and related diseases, such as diabetes type 1, as there is no classification for such diseases in the numerous data collection institutions in France. Even though many medical professionals believe these kinds of illness are environmentally triggered, state data collection is more focused on illnesses with large economic impact, thus auto-immune and related disease incidence rates remain unknown. These collection and classification norms form organisationally determined domains of unrealized knowledge, and this non-knowledge flows from one government domain to another and eventually reaches the public whose basic questions continue to be unanswered.

In the case of the residents of Fos, there is yet another kind of non-knowledge produced. This could be called "subverting the question" or non-answering though the rubric of risk. The citizens have questions such as: how prevalent is the respiratory illnesses and cancer in their town, or what is the health impact of the large variety of toxins in their air? Instead of attempting to answer these questions in a way that includes, and hopefully, satisfies the residents, the state funds numerous technical risk studies. Pollution exposure is then categorized by such terms as: exposure baselines, threshold values, emission profiles, and biomarker persistence. "The local people found these studies very strange", according to one public health official, "and did not know why they were conducted." Another spokesperson for a local mayor concurred and added, "many residents say that the right things were not studied as there were no studies begun from a human perspective, not just calculating risk using threshold values as people will not trust these studies—because they say they are certainly sick."

The shape of knowledge absence as it intersects with the spatial and political geography of west Provence can be mapped onto specific historical, social, and organisational contexts.[2] From the absolute power of the GPMM to the back office of a state bureaucrat determining health classification categories, the topography of ignorance takes complex and consequential shapes. In the case of the Fos/Etang residents, it may require thinking outside of the box—using new health study methods not yet recognized by state experts. It may be time for not only the people's questions to be at the center of a study, but for the people themselves to be asked: what is your health status? This kind of lay science which uses local voices and their health responses as data might finally be able to answer the questions that two decades of state studies have yet to address.

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TERRITORIAL GOVERNANCE IN WESTERN EUROPE BETWEEN

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Are States in contemporary Europe driven to enforce new forms of territorial convergence under the impact of economic crisis, enhanced European steering and international monitoring? Or is the evolution of sub-national governance largely driven by endogenous pressures? This very significant research question get to the heart of contemporary European States through a focus on the interplay between territorial capacities, domestic veto players and exogenous constraints. The article reports *interim* findings from a research project supported by the UK's Leverhulme Trust and the Collegium of Lyon on Territorial Governance in Western Europe between Convergence and Capacity[1]. The empirical data is focused mainly on four 'second order strong identity'regions: Andalucía (Spain), Brittany (France), Wales (UK) and Wallonia (Belgium). These regions share many characteristics. These hybrid regions are economically challenged yet have a distinctive and developed territorial capacity. They each have ingrained traditions of social-democratic party control. They are regions facing stark economic challenges and problems of economic adaptation. They are traditionally pro-European regions, or at least regions benefiting from substantial EU investment. They are regions with a strong sense of territorial identity. They have variable degrees of decentralised authority: as a minimum, each has a directly elected regional Assembly with powers ranging from a general competency to partial legislative authority. The four regions exist in states that cover the range of logical possibilities for comparison: a loose federal state (Belgium), a hybrid state with some federal characteristics (Spain), a predominantly unitary state modified by forms of asymmetrical devolution (United Kingdom) and a decentralised but still unitary state (France). The EU context provides the core similarity between these states, with three of the four participating in the euro and signed up to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG). The research involves sustained empirical investigation of sub-national governments and governance communities in the four regions over an 18 month period from November 2012 to May 2014.

TERRITORIAL GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC CRISIS: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

How did our regions face up to the combined pressures of economic crisis and political decentralisation[2]? Is the economic crisis recentralising previously decentralised functions, or is there no linkage between these two phenomena? Are convergence *and* divergence best considered as part of agency driven processes of adaptation and as strategic choices exercised by actors in regional governments? These questions were investigated via a series of semi-structured interviews with comparable panels of actors (of around 25 interlocutors) in each of our four regions. Identical questions were asked of our interlocutors in each region[3].

HAS ECONOMIC CRISIS PRODUCED A RECENTRALISATION OF PUBLIC FINANCES?

The most obvious effect of economic crisis has involved moves to strengthen central government control over regional and local government financial circuits. As central governments are now threatened with stiff fines if they do not respect the revised budget and debt criteria, enshrined in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, they are less willing to tolerate 'spendthrift'local and regional authorities. In some instances, in Spain notably, regions have attempted to hand back competencies to central government. In France and Spain, the proportion of local and regional government expenditure directly transferred by central government grants has been rising (usually with forms of hypothecation). Enhanced centralisation of local financial circuits could be observed in France, for example, mainly as the result of a major tax reform in 2010 that involved the abolition of the local collection and setting of business rates and its replacement by a more centralised formula-based method of tax collection (Steckel, 2012). In Spain, though many competencies have been devolved or are shared with the central state, 80% of the autonomous communities' financial resources are transferred by the central state (Harguindéguy, et al, 2014). Our investigation in Andalucía revealed a region under sustained financial pressure, suffering budgetary cuts from central government, a decreasing performance of regional taxes and a drying up of bank loans. Even more than in France and Spain, public finance remains a highly centralised policy field within the UK. The Welsh policy community demanded enhanced fiscal autonomy, but politicians were careful not to call into question the core block grant mechanism of financing devolution, based on the Barnett formula. Key actors involved see little prospect for significant change or reform, even in the event of Scottish independence. [4]

The case of Belgium stands apart (de Visscher and Laborderie, 2013). Once the sixth reform of the State has been fully implemented (in theory in 2014), the Federal government budget will be limited to servicing the national debt and funding part of social security, with all other functions having been regionalised. The Belgian case raises the issue of the relative lack of linkage between the post-2008 economic crisis and changes to the institutional architecture of the state; the causes of ever deepening decentralisation are linked to community competition, communitarisation and regionalisation that have their roots in Belgium's uneven history. The Belgian case demonstrated a high degree of polarisation on institutional questions between the main Flemish and francophone communities. Retaining credibility as a good European player, however, incited the main actors to agree on key measures of budgetary retrenchment; controlling the public debt was experienced less as an intolerable constraint than as a gauge of managerial credibility.

HAS ECONOMIC CRISIS RECENTRALISED DECENTRALISATION?

Rather more general analysis of the impact of the economic crisis on the decentralised and devolved forms of government revealed contrasting findings in our regions. Wales and Wallonia, in rather different ways, were tied up with endogenous programmes of state reform, and socio-economic issues of economic crisis were given less saliency than in either Andalucía or Brittany. In the cases of Wales and Wallonia, surprisingly little indication was provided in fieldwork of the impact of economic crisis on prospects



This European treemap visualization shows hierarchies in which the rectangular screen space is divided into about 1000 European NUTS2 regions. Each region belongs to a country in the
The size of the rectangle refers to «Total Population» while the colour attribute represents elderly population in Europe «age group 65+ in %». When the colour and size dimensions are cor
Germany has a high rate of eldery people while, for example, Poland has a younger representation. Dashboard Demonstrator: http://mitweb.itn.liu.se/GAV/dashboard/#story=data/nuts-reg

The RFIEA warmly thanks the National Center for Visual Analytics of the Linköpig University, Sweden, for allowing us to use this map.

CONVERGENCE AND CAPACITY

for devolved government. In Wales, at the time of empirical investigation (November 2012–July 2013) the Welsh Government had begun a process of streamlining public service provision, encouraging collaboration between service providers and introducing timid performance management measures. But local government spending on frontline services had been sheltered from the worst of the cuts and public service providers acknowledged that conditions might deteriorate. Welsh political debates were tied up in constitutional futures: whatever happened in the Scottish Independence referendum and its aftermath would have an impact on Wales. Likewise, the panel in Wallonia (interviewed in early 2014), though touched by economic crisis, was preoccupied with implementing the sixth state reform programme and deeply anxious about the prospect of further institutional and political deadlock after the 2014 federal elections.

The French and Spanish regions, on the other hand, were more fully engaged with enduring economic crisis and the effects of the economic downturn on the broader territorial model. In both regions, a general sense of pessimism was shared by representatives of all parties, employers' organisations, associations and trade unions. There was heightened consciousness of the crisis. In Brittany, there was a deep sense of pessimism about the future of the Breton model of intensive agriculture, inspired by the massive layoffs or plant closures in 2013 at food producers Doux, Tilly Sabco and Gad. In Andalucía, the atmosphere was also generally pessimistic; the crisis had highlighted the contradictions of the 'state of autonomies'. When forced to choose, Andalucían elites preferred solidarity between regions (using the historical debt of Spain towards Andalucía as an argument for continuing transfers) over differentiation and enhanced autonomy.



hierarchy. This colourful presentations accommodates thousands of statistical data items in a meaningfully organized display allowing patterns and exceptions to be spotted immediately.
related in some way with the tree structure, one can often easily see patterns that would be difficult to spot in other ways, such as if a certain colour is particularly relevant. We see that
ions-ageing-population-in-europe-2010.xml&layout=[map,treemap]

CONVERGING EUROPEANISATION? AN END OF THE EUROPE OF THE REGIONS?

Is what direction is the relationship between European integration and regional governments heading? Does the European Union still provide a structure of opportunities for a third tier of regional government? Or, on the contrary, does the fieldwork suggest scepticism towards the 'Europe of the Regions'? Europe is an important strand of regional governance. All the selected regions have been key beneficiaries of EU structural funds and the Common Agricultural Policy. All regions ought to be pro-European.

The field of European integration appears as one of clear differentiation between these traditionally pro-European regions. The principal cause of variation related, first, to whether or not a region is within the Eurozone and, second, to the degree of influence exercised domestically in relation to monetary policy (a highly Europeanised policy domain). Europeanisation might be understood as an independent variable, in the sense of the definition given by Cole and Drake (2000), where the direction of change and causality runs clearly from the European Union (and its multiple institutions) to member-states and regions. The Fiscal Compact Treaty (TSCG), agreed in December 2011 and signed in 2012 by 25 of the 27 EU member states, strengthened the automatic penalties to be paid by states who are unable to control their debt, or to bring into line their budgets to zero deficits by 2015. The TSCG came after a significant fiscal and budgetary tightening in the form of the Six Pack and the Two Pack, allowing the European Commission, through the European Semester process, a much more intrusive oversight into national budgets (including commenting upon national budgets before they have passed the parliamentary stage). The European Semester process produces annual reports on the strengths and, more usually, structural weaknesses of all EU states (including those, such as the UK and the Czech Republic, not having signed the TSCG). The details of these reports filter down into fields such as the housing market, wage indexation, pension ages – the core of traditional economic sovereignty. Numerous competencies dealt with by local and regional authorities are concerned; especially in those areas of infrastructure and investment such as road building, urban transport or education that required long-term capital investment.

Interlocutors in our three eurozone states expressed varying degrees of engagement with the European project. In Brittany, interviewees stressed their fundamentally pro-European sentiment: Europe was part of the Breton 'DNA'. One of the core novelties of the 2013 round of interviews related to disillusion with the European Union as an institution (though not with the European ideal). The 'neo-liberal'European model of the Barroso Commission was contrasted unfavorably, in interviews, with the traditional Breton model of partnership, cooperation and support for public services. The sense of relative deprivation was aggravated by the EU Commission placing obstacles in the way of direct aids from the French government. Andalucía is also traditionally a strongly pro-European region and a key beneficiary of EU structural funds and the CAP. Against a backdrop of diminishing enthusiasm for the European project, fieldwork uncovered two types of response to the EU question. First, interviewees lamented diminishing resources from the EU. Second, the PP-led government in Madrid was blamed for using the crisis as an argument to recentralise control over a number of policy sectors and tighten budgetary steering. Belgium offered another interesting case. Interviewees in Wallonia and Belgium overwhelmingly backed the European ideal: in the words of one interlocutor, Belgians were the 'last Europeans', now that even neighbouring Netherlands and France had moved in a less pro-European direction. One interviewee believed Belgians to be naïve, however; the European semester process and the recommendations made by Brussels to stop indexing salaries with inflation were met with consternation by the Belgian government. The commitment to zero deficit budgets by 2015 was proving extremely difficult for Belgium's regions and communities, as well as its local authorities; another interlocutor predicted damaging consequences for the level of infrastructural investment.

The exception is most obviously presented by Wales, part of the sterling zone. The UK's position outside of the Eurozone and the TSCG effectively shelters Wales from enhanced European budgetary supervision. In contrast to Scotland, Wales has no immediate existential choices to make and does not have to consider whether it might have to join the EU as a new member state. Welsh Government rhetoric remains staunchly pro-European. The EU remains seen as a benevolent fund-provider; there were clear signs of internal tension with UK premier Cameron and the commitment to hold a referendum in 2017 on the UK's future membership of the EU.

Even in the Belgian case, the fieldwork suggested diminishing enthusiasm for the Europe of the Regions. Against this general conclusion, some distinctions can be drawn, the most obvious of which is between: Spain and Belgium, whose regions were at the forefront of attempts at budgetary discipline, and Brittany and Wales, somewhat further removed. Membership of the eurozone certainly played itself out

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as one of the key differentiating variables between our regions. Beyond the UK exception, three positions were identified: one (Wallonia) of Europeanisation facilitating coordination across community divides and, in some sense, empowering regions to participate in budgetary retrenchment; a second (Andalucía) whereby the sacrifices required to conform to budgetary adjustment as a result of the economic crisis were deeply felt (but Madrid was principally blamed), and a third, that of traditionally pro-European Brittany, feeling a sense of (temporary) betrayal. Overall, we conclude that the economic crisis is producing tensions between the EU, central governments and second order strong identity regions.

THE FUTURES OF REGIONAL GOVERNANCE

The financial crisis has provided evidence of some recentralization of decentralization, and the latest phase of EU integration has forced central governments in most instances to attempt to exercise a tighter supervision over local and regional government expenditures. Europeanisation has produced a lessening of divergence in legal systems and in the provenance of much public policy. But domestic state structures, party systems and the political rules of the game still make sense nationally, leading writers such as Schmidt (2006) to diagnose a dangerous gap between (national) political competition and (European) policy formulation.

Over and above distinctive national institutional structures and territorial assymetries, our survey demonstrated a high level of convergence in relation to the futures of regional governance. Each of our 100 interlocutors was asked to identify the three principal challenges faced by the region over the next five year period. This measure was intended to capture how our panels of comparable actors envisaged the future of their respective regions. We conclude this article by observing the considerable regularities in terms of future policy challenges for our sample of European regions:

UNEMPLOYMENT, AND ESPECIALLY YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT (WALES, ANDALUCÍA, BRITTANY, BELGIUM).

The pressing state of unemployment was recognised in each of the four regions as the toughest challenge. The levels of youth unemployment in particular were presented as a major challenge. The example of Brussels, a city with a strong immigrant population and a high level of social deprivation, was instructive in this respect: the young unemployed of immigrant origin were primarily affected by socio-economic issues, their interest overlooked in the community based rivalry between Flemings and Walloons.

ECONOMIC RECONVERSION AND THE CAPACITY OF ESTABLISHED TERRITORIAL MODELS (WALES, ANDALUCÍA, BRITTANY, BELGIUM)

In each region, there was soul-searching about the capacity of the existing territorial model to cope with economic crisis and the challenges of reconversion. Members of our Breton panel described a peripheral region facing a huge crisis of reconversion. The traditional pillars of the Breton economy (agriculture, agro-alimentary) were crumbling and the model of social-economic 'concertation'was failing. Rather similar narratives emerged in each of our regions.

Education and levels of basic skills was a common theme in Wales, and Andalucía, to some degree in francophone Belgium and Brittany also. In Wales and Andalucià, raising the general educational level was identified as a vital priority. The Brittany region and Brussels-Wallonia Federation, starting from a much higher base, acknowledged problems of unequal educational performance.

POLITICAL DECENTRALISATION; CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

The saliency of forms of political devolution came after the first three socio-economic issues. In the case of Brittany, the perceived crisis of 2013 was linked by many respondents with a case for more political decentralisation and a thoroughgoing regionalisation. In Andalucía, the PSOE-IU led region was caught between resisting Madrid's sustained drive at recentralisation in education and arguing in favour of sustained 'solidarity'and continuing financial transfers from richer regions (such as Catalonia). In Wales, the future of devolution was a major preoccupation, but judgement was suspended while awaiting the outcome of the Scottish referendum. In Wallonia, there was no appetite for future decentralisation, but realisation that a new push from the Flemings would probably take place after the May 2014 elections.

PRESERVING PUBLIC SERVICES

These social-democratic regions all identified the preservation of public services (especially health and education) as core to preserving their own territorial model. Interviewees in the Spanish region were proud of the 'Andalucian model'of welfare, based on fiscal transfers from richer regions to Andalucía in the name of solidarity (and on transfers within Andalucía from the more affluent cities to the PSOE-led small towns). The panel in Brittany, likewise, used economic crisis to argue in favour of central state aid (forthcoming in the Breton plan of December 2013). In the case of Wales, fiscal transfers via the Barnett formula were given more importance than fiscal autonomy; recognising Welsh public service needs (and relative deprivation) was amongst the top priorities. In Wallonia, finally, defending public services in the name of solidarity was given a high priority.

These core challenges were sufficiently similar to support a conclusion based on ideational soft convergence. Certainly, the core challenges identified by regional decision-makers were not those, in general, that were readily amenable to regional influence. Our second order strong identity regions had limited control over core macro-economic levers, and each developed different versions of a mode of territorial action based on influencing central government and the EU, in a pattern of multi-level governance. Each of our regions had different mixes of territorial political capacity, and ways of exercising influence; other regions not included in the survey would not necessary share these priorities. The most significant distinction was between the two regions caught up in a process of ongoing political decentralisation (Wales and Wallonia) and the French and Spanish regions, which appeared more directly affected by the direction of economic crisis and whose territorial models struggled to cope with change.

References

1. Leverhulme Trust (IN-2012-109), 2012-15 'Territorial Governance in Western Europe: between Convergence and Capacity'Leverhulme Trust International Network award, 2012-2015. The PI extends his grateful support to the trust. The project *La gouvernance territoriale en Europe entre convergence et capacité* is also supported by the Collegium of Lyon.
2. For a robust general discussion, see Le Galès (2013)
3. Around 100 interviews were carried out in fieldwork from November 2012 to March 2014 in Wales, Brittany, Andalucía and Wallonia. We used a common interview schedule designed to elucidate the causal mechanisms that produce divergence and convergence (identified as being administrative, economic, epistemic, institutional, normative, interest-based or multi-level in character). A common interview schedule included questions that dealt with the impact of the economic crisis on decentralisation; on the direct effect of EU regulatory frameworks and the EU more generally; on 'best practice'in public services (including that promoted by the EU or by index ranking such as PISA); on patterns of intra- and inter-regional cooperation and policy learning; on inter-governmental relations, territorial political traditions and party linkages. Equivalent panels were contacted in each region, composed of three cognate groups: devolved government, regional or regional state actors; representatives of professional and policy communities in the fields of public finance and secondary education and elected representatives with competence in the field, controlled for by party affiliation. Interviews are being transcribed, data input into N-Vivo 10 and will be deposited with the UK Data Archive.
4. This view was expressed notably by Gerald Holtham at the British Academy conference of May 31st 2013. Reported in S. Tanburn, (2013) Wales, the United Kingdom and Europe, London: British Academy, pp. 14–15.

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SECURITY POLITICS AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE EU

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In this brief article I want to pose a few questions about the possible effects of security politics on the construction of a European citizenship. First, I shall define "security" and "citizenship", by referring both to the existing literature and to the social and political processes this literature analyzes. I shall then describe some of the legal and political measures adopted by the EU in the name of "security", principally, but not only, concerning migrants from third countries. These measures, combined with national and local legislations and rhetoric, I shall argue, tend to construct citizenship (at all levels: European, national, local) in exclusionary terms, around "fear" rather than "solidarity", using an "us vs them" logic. This construction is at odds with other ways to conceive citizenship at both the European and national levels: the Charter of fundamental rights, but also many national constitutions, by recognizing most rights independently of legal citizenship, de facto adopt and promote a "citizenship" which is in principle inclusive and based on what is called the European social model.

SECURITY

Since the early 1990s, a "ghost" is haunting most of Europe: security has become the focus of much public rhetoric and policies at the local, national and EU levels, and at the same time has become the object of a constantly growing specialized scientific literature. Yet, well before these years the question of security had been studied from the point of view of criminology, the sociology of deviance and social control, the sociology of law. Sociologists and criminologists described and analyzed a shift in the political understanding and management of crime and deviance in Western democracies which was being justified in the name of "security". Such shift may be summarized as follows: 1) "causes" of crime and deviance, whether economic, social, cultural, or (even) psychological came to be considered of little, if any, importance, in designing crime prevention or "war on crime" policies. Neither the social and economic environment, nor the minds of would be criminals need therefore to be changed: rather, policies should aim to make it more difficult to commit an illegal act, and to "incapacitate" those who commit them; 2) the attention shifted from "criminals" to "victims", especially potential ones, i.e., the good citizens who must be defended from crime. "Victims" get center stage in dealing with the criminal question (I explored the close relationship between "victim" and the neoliberal subject in Pitch, 2010; see also Brown, 2006 and Foessel, 2010); 3) measures to deal with crime and deviance came to a) be based on risk evaluations and the profiling of potentially "dangerous" populations, with the adoption of so-called situational prevention, i.e. measures geared to diminish the risk of being criminally victimized (CCTV, enclosure of public spaces, gated communities, "zero tolerance" local policies), and b) the multiplication of criminal offenses and the increase of penalties (the literature is enormous, see for example Cohen, 1985, O'Malley, 1992, Feeley, Simon, 1994, Garland, 2001). In short, security, risk prevention and risk minimization became the new key words and "safety" and the "containment of dangerousness" replaced "justice" and "social reform" (Bailey, Shearing, 1996). This shift occurred first in the US, which has to this day the by far largest imprisoned population of Western democracies. According to Simon (2003), the crisis of the Keynesian model which occurred in the US in the mid-sixties spurred the emergence of a mode of government "through crime", that is to say a government which used the "fear of crime" and the need for more "security" to legitimize itself and promote a "fight of crime model" of government in all relevant institutions. Others (Wacquant, 2009; De Giorgi, 2000) have spoken of the substitution of the social state by a penal state, and described the importation of this model in Europe during the 80s and 90s. The rise of the "security imperative" in public discourse and policy initiatives in most of the West has been documented and discussed widely not only by criminologists and sociologists of deviance and social control, but also by general sociologists, philosophers and political scientists (see, among others, Bauman 1999, Offe, 1999).

"Security", in this literature, mainly means "protection from risks of criminal victimization". In public and political discourse it is then possible to detect a significant shift in the meaning of security, as in the so-called Golden thirty years (1945-1975) security was used prevalently to signify *social* security, i.e. the protection from the risks of life (illness, unemployment, disability, poverty), to be provided to all citizens through proportional taxation (solidarity).

It appears, then, that in the past 40 years or so, the meaning of security in public discourse has reverted to its Hobbesian origins: protection of one's life, freedom from threats coming from other citizens (but for a more nuanced reading of Hobbes, see Foessel, 2010).

Indeed, in the European theoretical and philosophical tradition, security and citizenship are notions which imply each other. Hobbes posed internal and external security as the justification of the creation of the State by individuals who then become "citizens": internal security meant the monopolization of legitimate violence by the state to protect citizens from threats coming from other citizens; external protection meant the defense and inviolability of state borders. State, territory, nation: the extension of sovereign power to a territory produced together the nation and the "people". Security here means not only protection of individual citizens but also protection of a political community in a given territory from threats coming from the outside.

The two types of security were to be managed by different agencies: internal security was (mainly) the task of the police, external security was (mainly) the task of the army. Thus criminals and enemies were clearly separated. These two types of security were also the object of study of different disciplines: criminologists and sociologists studied the first, international affairs scholars, security experts and security agencies studied the second.

The end of the Cold War marked a significant change for the study and management of external security. External security itself came to be defined and constructed in a different way, as territorial borders increasingly became porous and states' sovereignty weakened through what is commonly called globalization. International terrorism and transnational organized crime contributed to the blurring of the distinction between criminals and enemies (I discussed this blurring in Pitch, 2010). As Bigo (2005) notes, security agencies started merging questions of policing and of defense. He also contends that this development was tied in with a discursive shift from threats of identifiable enemies to notions of risks, thus (I add) paralleling the similar discursive shift which occurred in criminology (see on this Cohen 1985, Garland, 2001).

But within security studies a new, critical and anti-realistic, approach emerged in the 90s, whereby "security" came to be considered a "speech act" by which policy questions are transformed into existential issues (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998). Within this approach, questions of security are seen not as something given, but as something constructed by political elites, which in this way transfer issues from normal, and democratic, political debate to an emergency register where it is the executive that is empowered to take the necessary decisions.
Critical security studies and critical criminology and sociology thus converge in the view that contemporary security issues have become dominant in political discourse and policy decisions not because threats have multiplied and become more serious, but on account of social, economic, political and policy changes which may be

summarized in the emergence and hegemony of a neoliberal political rationality and mode of government (among many others, see Brown, 2006, Dardot, Laval 2009). To summarize a complex series of arguments: socialized risks have been individualized and privatized, the responsibility for taking and avoiding them shifted from the State to the individual, the uncertainty and insecurity deriving from increased unemployment, precarious jobs and the erosion of welfare provisions has been deflected against "criminals", terrorists, migrants and asylum seekers…

CITIZENSHIP

Security and citizenship are connected, as I said, both from a philosophical point of view (Hobbes), and a sociological and empirical one. Citizenship is a legal status, signifying membership in a political community (see Costa, 2005), from which a number of rights and duties derive. In the second half of the last century, citizenship has come to mean that status which implies the entitlement to and actual enjoyment of civil, political and social rights (Marshall, 1950). In principle exclusionary (as that status which separates citizens from non citizens), citizenship in the Marshall sense of the term has an inclusive and expansionist meaning. Indeed, as I said, the long and rigid post Second World War constitutions of much continental Europe, recognizing a number of fundamental rights to persons, rather than to citizens, implicitly adopt and construct an inclusive and enlarged type of citizenship. The same may be said of the various international human rights declarations, pacts, and agreements, the European Charter of fundamental rights included.
Thus, security in its social sense and citizenship in its (more) inclusive sense appear to stand (and, perhaps, perish) together.

SECURITY POLITICS IN THE EU

While it was mainly criminologists and sociologists who studied the rise of the "fear of crime" model of government at the national and local levels (the literature is enormous, but to cite just a few, see: Body Gendrot 2000, Crawford 1998, Gautron 2006, Robert 1999, Castel 2003, Pavarini 2006, Pitch 2000 and 2001, Simon, 2003), the EU politics of security have been prevalently studied within the new critical security studies approach I mentioned. That is perhaps why there is as yet no comprehensive analysis that embraces all three levels of government, while it may be supposed that they are closely connected.

The EU politics of security have been mainly studied in the context of immigration and asylum seeking from third countries, but, as we shall see, they actually concern also EU citizens.

What it is called the "securitization" of immigration within EU politics precedes both the end of the Cold War and 9/11. As Huysmans says (2006), "In the European integration process an internal security field that connects issues of border control, terrorism, drugs, organized crime and asylum seeking was developed since the mid80s and gained extra momentum in the 1990s" (p. 1). It may seem a paradox that security measures and security rhetorics became very relevant in the EU at the time when a "territorialized enemy" (Bigo, 2006) had disappeared and a space of freedom of movement for EU citizens (and the virtual disappearance of national borders) was being instituted through the Schengen agreements (1985). On the one hand, especially for those scholars who focus on the workings of security agencies (see, for example, Bigo, 2005, 2006) this securitization process may be attributed, at least in part, precisely to the bureaucrats and security experts' need to re-orient and redefine their role in a changed context. On the other hand, this process may be seen as consistent with and functional to a neoliberal political rationality, whereby security in the EU "is directly related to the promotion of mobility and circulation of populations, goods and services" (van Munster, 2009, p. 98). Rather than being in contradiction, then, more freedom of movement for EU citizens, and increased restrictions for third country citizens respond to a "liberal notion of security", according to which social control is better achieved through administrative measures and regulations than by outright legal prohibitions. Indeed, as van Munster shows, while the mobility of EU citizens is promoted, the mobility of migrants "by effect of their risk class membership, is channeled through technologies of security which seek to render them increasingly immobile through preventing them from moving or, in case they move, by restricting and channeling their movement through technologies of risk management" (p. 98; the parallel with what has happened at the local and national levels is striking: see Lianos, Douglas, 2000). Risk and risk management, via the construction of potentially "dangerous populations", then, are at the core of EU security politics just as they are at the core of those national and local criminal justice changes criminologists and sociologists have been pointing at in the last 30 years.

The Schengen agreements at one and the same time made it easier for EU nationals to move through Europe and much more difficult for third country nationals to enter into and move through this space. In 1990 the Convention Applying the Schengen agreements directly connected immigration with terrorism and transnational crime, placing the regulation of immigration in an institutional framework that dealt with the protection of internal security. Indeed, while Schengen 1 was negotiated between and drafted by transport and foreign affairs officials, Schengen 2 was drafted by internal security professionals. In the 1985 agreements, security was not central, though it already provided a link between free movement and security concerns. After 9/11 the transfer of the security connotations of terrorism to the area of migration became explicit (cf.. Arts. 16 and 17 of the European Council Common Position on Combating Terrorism, December 2001). Migrants and asylum seekers shifted from being framed as a humanitarian or economic issue to being framed as a security issue, thus paralleling an analogous shift occurring at the national and local levels.

Though arguably migrants and asylum seekers constitute the

main population targeted by EU security politics, they are not the only one. The Schengen agreements and subsequent policy documents contemplate restrictions legitimated by security concerns also for EU nationals. Such restrictions may be applied by States when they think their security is threatened. How and why states decide to apply them is not being monitored, so these decisions are discretionary. Potential "troublemakers" may be stopped from crossing borders, and what constitutes "troublemaking" is an evaluation left to each country on the basis of "suspicion" and risk calculations, thus outside of any clear legal standards. A Security Handbook for the use of police at international events has also been created, on the same principles, and permanent "risk analysis" must be carried out by each national agency involved. The EU Council Recommendation of April 22 1996 calls for an overall assessment of the potential for disorder and the standardization of intelligence about suspected groups of troublemakers. Another EU Council Recommendation advocates the collection, analysis and exchange of information on all sizeable groups that may pose a threat to law, order and security when travelling to another member state to participate in a meeting attended by large numbers of persons from more than one Member State (1997) (Apap, Carrera, 2004). Policies developed to fight terrorism and illegal immigration are thus applied to EU citizens as well, by labeling them "unwanted", "unwelcome", "suspect". What is being restricted in this case is not only freedom of movement, but also other fundamental rights, such as the freedom of expression, since people are classified "suspect" on the basis of their political ideas and the assumption that they will want to express them. Thus, approaches, languages and techniques developed in the name of security against terrorism, organized crime and illegal immigration spill over and curtail fundamental rights of, also, EU citizens.

But there is another "at risk" population of EU nationals whose citizenship rights may be curtailed in the name of security. It is that composed of so-called "football hooligans". No definition of hooliganism has been provided by policies: "hooligans'" stigmatization, according to Tsoukala (2009) is accompanied by what she calls "a splintered definitional process that mirrors the evolving national and international security stakes" (p. 6), so that we can observe significant interactions between the security field as a whole and the counter-hooliganism policies at the European, state, and local levels (I have discussed the Italian case in Pitch, 2013). Since the tragedy at the Heysel stadium in 1985, situational prevention measures, centered on the segregation and surveillance of football spectators, has extended in terms of time (before and after games), space (places outside the football stadium) and targeted populations (potential troublemakers). Increased punishments and repressive administration measures (preventive detention included) are disposed for acts which would not be considered a crime or a threat outside a sporting event (Tsoukala, 2009). National and international football bans are imposed. The EU council recommendations I cited above apply to football and other sports' spectators as well as potential protesters. Indeed, the EU Council (2001) explicitly puts football hooliganism and political demonstrations together as "threats to urban security".

THE RISK OF SECURITY POLITICS

The criminological and sociological literature studying security politics and policies at the national and local levels, and the security studies analyzing these politics and policies at the EU level converge on the interpretation of their consequences. Not only they appear to be ineffective in reassuring the supposedly fearful population they purport to protect: they actually tend to escalate, by reproducing insecurity through "emergency" discourses which often use the language of war (on drugs, illegal immigration, terrorism, organized crime) and promising an impossible total security (Castel, 2003). The discursive register of security dictates the solution to the issues it is applied to: in other words, it is the solution which constructs the problem, as the case of immigration shows. Here we may note a very good example of a self-fulfilling prophecy: the shift of immigration from being seen as a humanitarian and economic problem to a security issue implies more restrictive immigration policies which on their turn push migrants towards illegality, plus reinforcing EU nationals' diffidence towards them.

The impact of these policies (and of the discourses justifying them) on the construction and interpretation of citizenship is twofold. On the one hand, they make it more difficult to become a EU national for migrants from third countries and on the other they restrict the very meaning of citizenship, by dividing the "good" citizens from the "bad" and curtailing the enjoyment of fundamental rights these last are entitled to on very fragile bases, i.e., suspicion and risk. These policies and accompanying discourses legitimize an "us" versus "them" political and cultural climate and a citizenship constructed through and by fear. As I said, citizenship is a status which is always in some measure exclusionary. But if we confront the way in which citizenship is constructed through security politics and discourses and the way it is conceived in the European Charter of fundamental rights (18-12-2000), we see two very different models. In the Charter, civil and social rights are due to persons, not citizens, and civil and social rights are posed as indivisible. This means that the Charter disposes that at the heart of the European project should lie the European social model, but, even more importantly for what I am trying to say here, it says that an European "people", or political community, should be an effect, rather than a pre-requisite of a European constitution. In the charter, then, a European political community is not supposed to be already existing and just in need of protection to preserve its integrity and "purity". Politics and rhetoric of security, on the other hand, produce and support a vision of an already given and culturally homogeneous political community, to be defended from internal and especially external threats (as Feeley and Simon, 1994, say about local communities: "communities… construct their boundaries around concerns and anxieties about crime… 'defensive exclusivity' can become a powerful dynamic in the formation and sustenance of communal existence, such that communities may increasingly come together less for what they share in common and more for what they fear", p. 260). Migrants are indeed constructed as a security threat not only because they are seen as potential criminals and terrorists, but also because they are supposed to contaminate a (fictitious) common cultural identity. The two citizenship models are in sharp contrast: and on the eve of difficult European elections, where many predict a sharp rise in xenophobic and nationalist votes, the inclusive one is at great risk.

> The end of the Cold War marked a significant change for the study and management of external security. External security itself came to be defined and constructed in a different way, as territorial borders increasingly became porous and states' sovereignty weakened through what is commonly called globalization. International terrorism and transnational organized crime contributed to the blurring of the distinction between criminals and enemies.

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LA RÉCEPTION DU ROMAN GREC ANTIQUE AU XIX^e SIÈCLE

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Ourania Polycandrioti, 2013 © Christophe Delory

« Il n'existe pas de genre littéraire qui ait conquis le monde autant que le roman », écrivait en 1921 Aristotélis Kourtidis, savant réputé, pédagogue et homme de lettres, dans la publication du texte de la conférence qu'il avait prononcée à la Société Littéraire « Parnassos » quatre années auparavant, en 1917, sur « Alexandre Rizos-Rangavis auteur de récits ». La suprématie désormais indubitable du genre romanesque en Europe ainsi que les tentatives dans cette direction des auteurs grecs, qui annonçaient l'expansion croissante du genre aussi dans l'espace hellénique, imposaient, selon Kourtidis, qu'on rétablît la civilisation grecque à la hauteur de la civilisation européenne par l'intégration du genre romanesque dans la tradition littéraire grecque, par le rappel de sa relation étroite avec l'hellénisme et, naturellement, de sa généalogie remontant à l'antiquité. Kourtidis fait donc plonger les racines du roman européen moderne dans le roman de l'antiquité tardive pour des raisons de prestige national. Les raisons avancées par Kourtidis afin de justifier la pertinence de l'identification généalogique d'un genre qui avait déjà submergé le paysage littéraire international sont celles de la nécessité et de la survie nationale, dans la mesure où cette relation généalogique directe devait contribuer au combat de la nation « pour l'existence », lequel se livrait jusque sur les « frontières intellectuelles ».

N'oublions d'ailleurs pas que la conférence sur Rangavis a été prononcée durant la Première Guerre mondiale, et que sa publication a eu lieu au cours d'une période de troubles et de revendications territoriales, précédant de peu la catastrophe d'Asie Mineure. La revendication de l'origine grecque antique du roman européen est donc imposée, selon Kourtidis, par la nécessité de renforcer l'identité nationale et culturelle. L'idée de la continuité de la nation grecque depuis l'antiquité constituait d'ailleurs la doctrine majeure destinée à étayer l'identité néo-hellénique : elle avait joué un rôle déterminant depuis l'époque de Coray et tout au long du XIX^e siècle, trouvant à s'appliquer dans toutes les manifestations de la vie intellectuelle. Parallèlement, dans le champ des études littéraires, l'approche généalogique (ontologique) des genres reflète tout autant les tendances de la critique littéraire du XIX^e siècle – qui considère les genres comme des organismes vivants soumis au développement et à l'évolution – que la conception historiographique sur l'évolution de type généalogique des nations et sur leurs particularités caractérielles ; Kourtidis réactive ainsi l'idée de la « continuité », de la permanence de la Grèce, qui a principalement marqué le XIX^e siècle, et tente d'intégrer le roman dans une lignée ininterrompue allant de l'antiquité hellénique à l'Europe des temps modernes, renforçant ainsi la fierté nationale à travers la distinction culturelle de la Grèce dans l'espace européen.

Relier le roman antique au roman moderne n'était cependant pas une idée neuve, ni même une idée exclusivement grecque. En effet, le développement progressif du roman au XIX^e siècle avait déjà conduit les études littéraires en Europe à confronter ces deux expressions de la fiction narrative. Cependant, le traitement de cette relation dans un esprit national, dans une perspective généalogique et évolutionnaire, avait débuté chez Coray, puis avait trouvé des continuateurs chez d'autres érudits pendant les dernières décennies du XIX^e siècle et finalement chez Kourtidis au début du XX^e. Par conséquent, chronologiquement, c'est Adamance Coray qui précède, par cette fameuse lettre adressée à Alexandros Vassiliou qui constitue les « Prolégomènes » à l'édition des Éthiopiques d'Héliodore (1804), incluse dans l'édition posthume de la collection des *Prolégomènes* aux auteurs grecs de l'antiquité (1833). C'est ensuite Constantin I. Dragoumis, auteur d'une *Histoire de la création romanesque chez les Grecs de l'antiquité* (1865-66) et Tryphon Évangélidis avec *La création romanesque chez les Grecs de l'antiquité étendue jusqu'à nos jours* (1899, 1910). Kourtidis lui-même avait déjà publié une brève étude sur Héliodore en 1908-1909. Les érudits qui s'attachèrent au cours du XIX^e siècle à l'étude du roman grec antique comparé au roman moderne européen mais aussi grec, à l'exception bien sûr de Coray, étaient donc des intellectuels d'importance mineure. Ils n'étaient pas ceux dont le discours et la pensée laissèrent leur empreinte à l'avant-garde intellectuelle, mais ceux qui, appuyés sur la tradition, voulurent renforcer le sentiment et la fierté de la nation. Entre parenthèses, on pourrait noter que par analogie avec ce qui se passait en Europe, en Grèce pendant le dernier quart du XIX^e siècle a émergé une couche d'érudits qui a agi au sein de la sphère publique en relation surtout avec la presse ainsi qu'avec l'éducation scolaire et s'est adressée au grand public de diverses manières. Il ne s'agit point d'une élite d'intellectuels mais d'une sous-catégorie qui, de conscience plutôt de pédagogue que d'intellectuel, a approché la société grecque de l'intérieur et non pas d'en haut, avec ses propres normes et principes et avec sa propre langue et morale. Le statut professionnel de pédagogue ou l'intervention plus générale de ces érudits aux institutions de l'éducation renforce l'importance de leur présence dans la sphère publique, puisque, d'après leur rôle et en tant qu'auteurs de manuels scolaires, conversent avec le discours officiel de l'État et deviennent ses agents dans la société. Il s'agit de l'expression particulière d'une tendance plus générale vers la formation des Grecs qui met l'accent sur des questions d'éducation nationale, sociale et morale et s'est manifestée à travers les orientations idéologiques et la thématique de la littérature, son interconnexion avec des tendances analogues en ethnologie et en histoire, le développement de la littérature enfantine, la création d'autant plus contrôlée par l'État des manuels scolaires, la fondation des associations culturelles, la croissance des maisons d'édition, la publication de journaux et de revues, etc.

Dans ce contexte, si pour Kourtidis l'origine grecque antique du roman constituait l'adoption fière d'une réussite intellectuelle majeure, pour les érudits précédents cette filiation antique ne fonctionnait pas en

mêmes termes de revendication de fierté, mais bien en ceux d'une sauvegarde du prestige des ancêtres face à un genre qui, dans sa version moderne, était généralement discrédité. Le roman, du début jusqu'à la fin du XIX^e^ siècle, n'était pas encore un genre admis par le monde des érudits grecs, à cause de ses relations avec l'imaginaire aux dépens de la représentation de la réalité. Ainsi, d'une part il provoquait de violentes querelles littéraires et, de l'autre, son aura européenne constituait une menace pour l'hellénocentrisme et l'éducation morale des Grecs modernes. L'enveloppe idéologique de cette corrélation entre roman ancien et moderne est donc à chaque fois constituée de composantes différentes selon l'époque et le degré de développement et de réception du genre romanesque en Grèce et en Europe.

Les termes déjà utilisés par les Européens dans leurs études littéraires portant sur le roman grec antique (roman, *romanzo*, *novel*) permettaient d'ailleurs l'approche commune du roman grec antique et du roman européen moderne, de façon anachronique et fortement arbitraire d'ailleurs, puisqu'on avait toujours su que les anciens n'avaient pas inventé de terme particulier pour ce genre. Les textes compris sous cette dénomination (anciens et modernes) constituaient ainsi des échantillons d'un seul et même genre, en dépit du fait que le roman grec de l'antiquité, ainsi que ses divers avatars médiévaux, présentaient une structure parfaitement définie et constante alliée à une visée morale précise se rapprochant fort peu du roman psychologique ou du roman réaliste polyphonique aux multiples niveaux narratifs du XIX^e^ siècle répondant au modèle des œuvres de Balzac, de Zola et des romanciers russes.

RÉALITÉ ET IMAGINATION

Étant donné que le rapport de la prose au réel était la condition idéologique et esthétique exigée à l'époque, la question qui surgit porte sur le mode de choix qui régit la perception du roman grec antique par les érudits grecs au cours du XIX^e^ siècle mais aussi au début du XX^e^. Les études européennes, auxquelles ils se référaient par excellence, avaient déjà clairement souligné la prédominance de l'imaginaire dans le roman grec antique, composante qu'ils considéraient d'ailleurs avec dédain.

Alexis Chassang, pour lequel il allait de soi que la vérité historique du contenu mais aussi la vraisemblance de la narration devaient constituer des critères essentiels d'évaluation des romans antiques, avait naturellement souligné la prévalence de l'imaginaire dans le roman grec antique dans lequel, entre autres, il relevait principalement les interventions divines dans le cours de l'intrigue. Il considère également que la description des sociétés ne correspond pas à la réalité historique, que les incidents de la vie quotidienne sont improbables et irréalistes, tandis que l'analyse des sentiments est superficielle et se limite à la description des circonstances intimes qui les font naître. Fréquemment, il met l'accent sur des incompatibilités et des ruptures concernant le contenu impudique et érotique qui vient s'opposer à la pureté exceptionnelle et à la morale des héros. À l'occasion des romans d'Héliodore, il note que l'absence de toute vraisemblance constitue la caractéristique commune de tous les romans grecs antérieurs et postérieurs à cette période et fait de cette absence la règle générale de la production

Pierre-Auguste Cot, *La Tempête*, 1880. Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

romanesque qui se développe à l'époque dans la littérature grecque. Le fait que Coray, dans son effort pour accentuer l'origine classique du roman de la basse antiquité, avait souligné les nombreuses dettes d'Héliodore envers la poésie épique mène Chassang à le critiquer avec l'argument que les modèles du prosateur ne doivent pas être recherchés dans le discours poétique ; la prose poétique d'Héliodore, selon Chassang, constitue un « genre faux ».

Erwin Rohde, de son côté, afin de prouver que le roman grec antique ne constituait pas le produit du tempérament enclin à l'imagination des peuples de l'Orient, ainsi que l'avait soutenu Huet, mais qu'il constituait l'évolution naturelle de la tradition grecque, devait interpréter la présence marquée et la fonction particulière de l'imaginaire dans le roman. Selon Rohde, la thématique de l'amour provenait de la poésie érotique tandis que les voyages prodigieux à des lieux inconnus et imaginaires prenaient leurs sources dans la littérature de voyages imaginaires et la description des lieux utopiques. La description vraisemblable et réaliste de l'Atlantide dans la *République* de Platon, de Coucouville-les-Nuées dans les *Oiseaux* d'Aristophane et les descriptions des lieux imaginaires par Éphémère de Messine sont tous des textes antérieurs à la conquête romaine. Ils constituent des preuves d'une tradition qui admettait l'imaginaire dans le but de critiquer la situation de l'époque et de rechercher des issues à la réalité. L'outil indispensable à la représentation littéraire du contenu imaginaire au cours de la basse antiquité a été fourni par la seconde sophistique qui a souvent cultivé la rhétorique au détriment de la profondeur et de la vérité des propos. Finalement, le roman grec antique s'est avéré une échappatoire à la réalité à travers l'art du discours, la narration fictionnelle.

Les théories de Rohde ont été de nos jours en partie réfutées, les objections portant principalement sur sa façon de joindre poésie amoureuse élégiaque et narration de voyages imaginaires et touchant par conséquent la mesure selon laquelle le roman grec antique constitue véritablement la continuité d'une tradition précédente. Cependant, la préférence du roman grec antique pour l'imagination demeure un fait. Yiorgis Yatromanolakis note à ce sujet : « Le roman grec antique né […] à une époque où la *mimésis* du monde constituait le jeu littéraire suprême, et où la *technê* avait le pas sur la *physis,* le genre ne pouvait manifester de préférence exclusive envers l'élément réaliste. Le prodigieux et le magique était ce qu'il recherchait, puisque c'était ce qu'exigeait son créateur et « écrivain » primordial, à savoir son lecteur quotidien ».

Le roman grec antique était en vérité un « romantzo », une histoire sentimentale, une aventure prodigieuse de déplacements. Par rapport au roman du XIXe siècle, il est régi par une logique totalement différente à l'intérieur de laquelle le rôle du divin et du Destin est crucial. Il a d'autres objectifs qu'il atteint sans disséquer la réalité sociale de son époque, mais qui conduit à une autre réalité, une réalité idéale, dans un cadre spatio-temporel délibérément imprécis. Par conséquent, il serait sans objet de rechercher en lui une analyse de caractères semblable à celle du roman réaliste ou psychologique du XIXe siècle, ou bien encore une perception et une représentation de la réalité analogues.

D'ailleurs Émile Zola, que Kourtidis loue particulièrement dans son étude sur Rangavis, et qu'il mentionne à part parmi les inspirateurs de modèles du roman contemporain, s'était exprimé de manière dédaigneuse au sujet du roman grec antique, exactement parce qu'il n'avait que fort peu de relation avec la représentation fidèle de la réalité : « La fiction y règne en souveraine ; ce ne sont que mensonges, que faits merveilleux, qu'intrigues embrouillées et incroyables. Les conteurs n'y ont presque jamais mis un détail juste et observé, les mille petits incidents de la vie intime y font défaut ; et ces œuvres, qui devraient peindre la société telle qu'elle était alors, nous emportent dans un monde fabuleux, au milieu d'aventures mensongères et de personnages extravagants. On sent que le roman n'a jamais été pour les Grecs une peinture de la vie réelle, encadrée dans une action vraisemblable ; il a été uniquement pour eux un poème vulgaire, un conte merveilleux qui charmait leur vive imagination, un entassement de fables d'autant plus attrayantes qu'elles étaient plus compliquées, un ragoût largement épicé de luxure qui réveillait le palais blasé des lecteurs de la décadence ».

Dans l'espace grec, c'est Coray qui avait déjà tracé la voie à la perception du roman grec antique, fondé sur l'œuvre de l'évêque d'Avranches, Pierre-Daniel Huet, *Traité de l'origine des romans* (1670). D'ailleurs, quand il avait nommé le roman grec antique en tant que « mythistoria », il l'avait défini en tant que « histoire fausse, mais probable, d'épreuves et déboires amoureux, savamment écrite de manière dramatique, principalement en prose », suivant en cela Aristote pour lequel les hommes ne peuvent trouver plaisir qu'à des histoires convaincantes ou bien déjà connue d'eux, et non à des créations sans fondement logique nées de l'imagination. De cette façon, Coray, non seulement il oriente l'intérêt des Grecs vers l'antiquité, mais il s'oppose aussi indirectement au roman européen à l'imagination marquée.

Aussi bien Dragoumis qu'Evangélidis contournent avec quelque embarras la question de l'imaginaire par d'importantes questions de structure, de contenu, mais aussi d'idéologie, posées par les romans antiques. Par ailleurs, ils insistent sur leur caractère haut en couleurs, leur dimension informative et leur valeur historique. Il est évident que Kourtidis a puisé dans l'ouvrage de Rohde aussi bien que dans celui de Coray afin d'affirmer l'origine grecque du roman moderne, mais qu'il a à son tour passé sous silence toute remarque sur le substrat imaginaire du genre antique. Ce serait une erreur, écrit Kourtidis, de juger ces romans par rapport à leur « classicisme ». Au contraire, « Du point de vue esthétique, nous trouvons que ces œuvres retiennent en elles l'atmosphère de leur temps. Les mœurs, la famille, sont fidèlement dépeints ». Dans un article plus ancien sur Héliodore, Kourtidis repère cependant dans les Éthiopiques d'importantes faiblesses concernant les analyses psychologiques des personnages, tout en reconnaissant « une conception aiguë du monde sensible et une habileté descriptive », qui font d'Héliodore, à son avis, un précurseur de Zola. Il se hâte néanmoins d'ajouter que les analogies entre Héliodore et Zola ne vont naturellement pas jusqu'à couvrir la question de la morale. Selon Kourtidis, Héliodore est un parfait moraliste, aux antipodes de Zola, et les *Éthiopiques* pourraient occuper une place distinguée dans l'histoire des idées morales. En conclusion, il note que les romans grecs antiques, en dépit des préjugés dont ils sont l'objet, trouvent consécration dans l'envergure de leur rayonnement, c'est-à-dire dans le fait qu'ils sont devenus membres de la « confédération littéraire mondiale ».

La description vraisemblable et réaliste de l'Atlantide dans la *République* de Platon, de Coucouville-les-Nuées dans les *Oiseaux* d'Aristophane et les descriptions des lieux imaginaires par Éphémère de Messine sont tous des textes antérieurs à la conquête romaine. Ils constituent des preuves d'une tradition qui admettait l'imaginaire dans le but de critiquer la situation de l'époque et de rechercher des issues à la réalité. Finalement, le roman grec antique s'est avéré une échappatoire à la réalité à travers l'art du discours, la narration fictionnelle.

Dragoumis, Évangélidis et Kourtidis ont évidemment envisagé le roman antique en tant que genre d'origine grecque, en tant qu'une représentation du réel privilégiant la beauté de la forme discursive et l'orientation vers l'édification morale. Ils ont délibérément laissé de côté le rôle structurel qu'y jouent l'imagination et l'improbable et ont ainsi négligé le fait que l'objectif des romans antiques n'était absolument pas la représentation de la réalité, à laquelle au contraire ils offraient une échappatoire à travers un environnement nébuleux (dans le temps et l'espace) noyé dans la brume de l'époque classique. En outre, ils se sont détournés du fait que les personnages du roman antique agissent en dehors d'une structure sociale donnée, en dehors d'un temps historique défini qui déterminerait leur position et leurs attitudes (ainsi qu'il arrive avec le roman du réalisme et du naturalisme du XIXe siècle), mais au contraire selon les volontés du Destin et du divin. Étant donné le développement du roman dans l'espace européen et sa diffusion de plus en plus grande dans l'espace grec, le souci commun des trois érudits du XIXe siècle était de rétablir la relation du roman moderne avec l'antiquité grecque, soit afin d'étendre son prestige, soit pour lui attribuer la réussite d'une nouvelle réalisation, toujours dans le cadre impératif du renforcement de l'identité culturelle et nationale.

L'influence des romans grecs antiques sur la création littéraire européenne est une question complexe défendue par une abondante bibliographie internationale. En ce qui concerne le XIXe siècle grec, nous pourrions formuler les grands traits de certains facteurs qui, selon toute probabilité, ont facilité le traitement positif des romans antiques dans le cadre d'une argumentation nationale et patriotique. Les romans antiques sont principalement centrés sur les personnages et, sans être exactement concernés par leur vie intérieure, ils traitent néanmoins les relations interpersonnelles et familiales, ce qui les rend plus proches du roman social du XIXe siècle. La vérité personnelle du sentiment et la nécessité de l'union du couple à l'intérieur d'une structure sociale dont le noyau est la famille et non la cité ont rendu aisée la perception de ces romans dans l'optique de l'époque contemporaine. Leur réalisme, quel qu'il soit, est personnel et concentré sur l'individu, tandis que leur morale est proche des principes moraux du christianisme, élément qui s'accorde à la tradition des lectures édifiantes du XIXe siècle. Cependant, l'élément qui prédomine dans cet intérêt des érudits du XIXe siècle pour les romans grecs antiques est le caractère hellénocentrique de son contenu et bien sûr la langue. D'elle-même, la langue constitue un facteur majeur de nationalité et a conduit à l'appropriation des romans grecs, à leur intégration dans l'héritage culturel hellénique. L'intérêt des savants européens manifesté pour le roman grec antique au cours du XIXe siècle a accentué davantage le prestige du genre et a permis d'établir une corrélation avec le passé ancestral, même si ce passé est celui de la basse antiquité, au cours de laquelle la pureté généalogique n'est plus soutenue que par la suprématie linguistique.

Notes

1. Le texte de la conférence de Kourtidis a fait l'objet d'une publication sous le titre : *Το ελληνικόν διήγημα μέχρι της Επαναστάσεως. Ο Αλέξανδρος Ραγκαβής ως διηγηματογράφος* [Le récit grec jusqu'à la Révolution. Alexandros Rangavis auteur de récits], éditeur Michaïl S. Zissakis, Athènes 1921, p. 5.

THE AMBIVALENCE OF BLURRED BOUNDARIES: WHERE INFORMALITY STOPS AND CORRUPTION BEGINS?

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For years, I have been working on issues of informality. Yet these issues are often also branded as corruption. The research question whether the boundaries between the two can be drawn cannot be answered with help of definitions. Analytical distinctions prove useless in the face of practices emb edded in particular sets of constraints, practical norms and 'moral economies' (Olivier de Sardan 1999, 2008). If I am asked to give a one-word clue to identify the missing bit in the puzzle of crossing boundaries between informality and corruption, I would say—ambivalence. In its sociological sense, ambivalence, in the definition of Robert Merton, refers to incompatible normative expectations of attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour. The incompatibility is assigned to a status and the social structures that generate the circumstances in which ambivalence is embedded (Merton 1976: 6-7). The core type of sociological ambivalence puts contradictory demands upon the occupants of a status in a particular social relation. Since these norms cannot be simultaneously expressed in behaviour, they come to be expressed in an oscillation of behaviours: of detachment and compassion, of discipline and permissiveness, of personal and impersonal treatment (Merton 1976: 8).

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THE BI-POLAR CONCEPT OF AMBIVALENCE

In the context of modernity, ambivalence is associated with fragmentation and failure of manageability. Zygmunt Bauman defines ambivalence as the possibility of assigning an object or an event to more than one category and views it as a language-specific disorder. The main symptom of disorder is the acute discomfort we feel when we are unable to read the situation properly and to choose between alternative actions (Bauman 1991: 1, 12). Bauman lists ambivalence among "the tropes of the 'other' of order: ambiguity, uncertainty, unpredictability, illogicality, irrationality, ambivalence, brought about by modernity with its desire to organise and to design" (Bauman 1991: 7). Ambivalence thus implies a form of disorder and negativity.

In my view, ambivalence can be singled out from the Bauman's list for its bi-polarity, oscillating duality (both order and disorder; both positivity and negativity), and relative clarity of the polar positions. It is a social counterpart of emotional ambivalence in psychology (love-hate) or materials with ambivalent qualities in physics (semiconductors). In other words, it is a situation of co-exiting thesis and anti-thesis, without possibility and certainty of their synthesis, yet without uncertainty as to what co-existing views, attitudes and beliefs are. The latter qualification would not apply to ambivalence in psychoanalysis, where is often associated with ambiguity. For the purposes of the following discussion of substantive, functional and normative ambivalence, I distinguish the concept of ambivalence from ambiguity in the following ways. First, ambivalence is a bi-polar concept, not multi-polar as is the case with ambiguity. Its poles (thesis and anti-thesis) are clearly defined. There is little uncertainty as to what these poles, or co-existing views, attitudes and beliefs are. The uncertainty is created by the unpredictability of their actualisation. The incompatibility of constituents of the ambivalence is different from duplicity, from the deliberate deceptiveness in behaviour or speech, or from double-dealing. When moulded by the clashing constraints, ambivalence can result in the ability for doublethink (the illogical logic), dual functionality (functionality of the dysfunctional) and double standards (for us and for them). The ambivalence is best understood through the paradoxes it produces, such as the role of hackers in advancing cybersecurity, for example, and can be identified by looking into the open secrets of societies (Ledeneva 2011).

BLAT

My interest in the theme of ambivalence originated in a study of *blat*—the use of personal networks for getting things done in Soviet Russia, or Russia's 'economy of favours' (Ledeneva 1998). The latter referred not only to the circulation of favours—favours of access to the centrally distributed goods, services and privileges—but also to the sociability of *blat* channels—friends and friends of friends routinely used for tackling shortages and problems. The pervasiveness of *blat* turned favours into an alternative currency of 'mutual help and mutual understanding' needed for the functioning of non-market economy and embodied peoples' frustration with the non-consumerist ideology and political constraints of the centralised planning and distribution. On the individual level, favours delivered by friends, acquaintances and friends of friends granted solutions to small time problems. On a societal level, they represented a way out for the Soviet system that struggled to adhere to its own proclaimed principles. A discreet re-distribution of resources within social networks—an implicit social contract, known as the 'little deal'—became part of the solution (Millar 1985).

The contradictory nature of constraints, and informal practices needed to resolve them, are well reflected in the anecdote about six paradoxes of socialism:

- No unemployment but nobody works.
- Nobody works but productivity increases.
- Productivity increases but shops are empty.
- Shops are empty but fridges are full.
- Fridges are full but nobody is satisfied.
- Nobody is satisfied but all vote unanimously.

Each of these paradoxes hides a reference to an informal practice that helped the Soviet system to continue with its formal claims for superiority, yet also undermined the declared principles.

A Russian phrase '*nel'zya, no mozhno*,' (prohibited, but possible) offered a summary understanding of the Soviet society with its all-embracing restrictions and the labyrinth of possibilities around them (the shops are empty but fridges are full). *Blat* was an open secret for insiders, but a puzzle for outsiders unequipped for handling the 'doublethink' associated with *blat*. It was not that a formal 'no' necessarily turned into 'yes' after pulling some *blat* strings. The formula *no+blat=yes* is misleading, for it emphasizes the importance of *blat* but downplays the importance of constraints. In the Soviet times, even outsiders could make useful friends and mobilise them and their networks to get things done. Yet there was always a limit to what friends could do. Sometimes *blat* worked and sometimes it didn't. Thus, its formula should grasp both ends of the paradox, that is *blat=no* (shops are empty), and at the same time *blat=yes* (fridges are full).

BLAT AND SHORTAGE

No coherent rules about *blat* economy of favours, which were predominantly associated with access to goods and services in short supply, could be deduced: it was both the formally

prescribed 'no' and the informally pushed 'yes' that constituted an ambivalent outcome, somewhat dependant on the size and potential of the networks, while also being constraint-driven, context-bound, uncertain and irregular. Moreover, under conditions of shortage (or rationing), a positive outcome for one was preconditioned by negative outcomes for the others. While the state monopoly of centralised distribution created shortages, the monopolisation of *blat* re-distribution by each particular gatekeeper perpetuated these shortages further. The constraints of socialism drove people to outwit the centralised distribution system. At the same time the harshness of these constraints made it impossible for the regime to fully enforce the existing regulations, which created opportunities for brokers to circumvent them. 'Pushers' of constraints (*tolkachi* and *blatmeisters*) created value for themselves and their networks at the expense of less-opportunistic players. Thus, functionally, *blat* softened the constraints of the Soviet system for some but was dependent on the continuing existence of constraints for others. Working with constraints to unleash their enabling power became the preoccupation of experienced brokers, who often functioned for the sake of the Soviet system but contrary to the system's own rules. Thus *blat* could function in both productive and non-productive ways.

INFORMAL PRACTICES THAT MAKE ENDS MEET

Obtaining goods and services through *blat* channels provided just one example of the many informal practices that made the Soviet regime more tolerable and, at the same time, helped to undermine its political, economic and social foundations. In his *Economics of Shortage*, Janos Kornai theorizes principles of rationing, or the non-price criteria of allocation, and forms of allocation of resources (Kornai 1979). Each of these can be associated with an informal practice, serving specific needs at various stages in socialist development. For example, associated with queuing is the practice of absenteeism from a workplace (no unemployment, but nobody works), that in late socialism served people's consumption, but also served to alleviate the hardship of queuing and to reduce criticism towards the regime, incapable of tackling shortages. Because absenteeism had utility for late socialism and could not be ruled out completely, it was prosecuted by authorities in selective campaigns, often to signal that the practice went out of proportion or to punish regional and local officials, on whose territories the raids for absentees in the shops' queues were made. Selective enforcement, or under-enforcement, became the reverse side of over-regulation.

The theme of ambivalence became similarly central for the post-communist transition. In my following book, *How Russia Really Works*, I argue against the stigmatisation of practices that replaced blat during Russia's dramatic break-up with its communist past. Contrary to the assumption that informal practices had to disappear once the oppressive system collapsed, I identified new practices that emerged and functioned ambivalently in order to serve the transition: they both supported and subverted the post-Soviet political, judicial and economic institutions. Newly established in the 1990s democratic and market institutions, including competitive elections, free media, independent judiciary, and private property rights, became enveloped in informal practices that both facilitated their development and undermined it. Practices associated with manipulation of electoral campaigns (black public relations or piar), misuse of information and compromising materials (*kompromat*), use of informal control and leverage (*krugovaya poruka*) in the formally independent judiciary, circumventing market-induced economic constraints with barter schemes, non-transparent ownership and creative accounting were the most widespread in that period (Ledeneva 2006).

BLAT AND SISTEMA

My initial theorization of the ambivalent role of *blat* networks has also helped in the subsequent exploration of the network-based system of informal governance—*sistema*—under Putin. In periods of stability, the ambivalent workings of *blat* networks at the grassroots are indeed similar to those of power networks in *sistema*, but one important distinction has to be emphasised. If the *blat* 'economy of favours' had to some extent an equalising effect on the chances of accessing resources for networked individuals and thus reduced the privilege gap between insiders and outsiders od the centralised distribution system, the trickle-down effect of the present-day 'economy of kickbacks' seems to be reverse: it undermines competition, excludes the outsiders, and rewards insiders through network-based allocation and mobilisation. If *blat* networks tended to operate on the basis of obligation perceived as 'mutual help', power networks tend to operate on the basis of a hierarchical, patron–client logic, associated with practices of 'feeding' (*kormlenie*) aimed to enhance the power of the ruler and leave his subordinates under his 'manual control' (Ledeneva 2013). This difference also stems from the political and economic frameworks in which networks operate. As the Soviet system was not economically viable due to its centralisation, rigid ideological constraints, shortages and the limited role of money, *blat* networks had some equalising, 'weapon of the weak,' role in the oppressive conditions, and to some extent served the economic needs of the central distribution system. In Putin's Russia, power networks operate without those constraints and extract multiple benefits from the post-Soviet reforms, while undermining the key principles of market competition (equality of economic subjects and security of property rights) and the key principle of the rule of law (equality before the law). They are, in effect, the 'weapon of the strong.' The effect of dominance, omnipresence, pressure under which everyone has to live is often referred to as 'sistema.'

What it lacks in democratic graces, Russia's sistema appears to compensate with the effectiveness of its informal incentives, control and capital flows operated by power networks and their impressive capacity to mobilise. Reliance on networks enables leaders to mobilise and to control, yet they also lock politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen into informal deals, mediated interests and personalised loyalties. This is the 'modernisation trap of informality': one cannot use the potential of informal networks without triggering their negative long-term consequences for institutional development (Ledeneva 2013).
The similarity of functional ambivalence of both blat and power networks points to an important dimension of Russia's modernisation: in order to modernise, one should not only change the formal rules, but also modernise networks. Modernising networks in the context of informality and corruption first of all means changing people's attitudes to favours of access for 'svoi' at all levels. Networks through which favours are channelled, and their functional ambivalence, are essential for the understanding of economies of favours and their similarities with and differences from corruption.

THE BLURRED BOUNDARIES BETWEEN SOCIABILITY AND INSTRUMENTALITY

It is possible to establish a borderline to distinguish between friendship and *blat* (the use of friendship) in practical terms—if a help to a friend comes from one's own pocket, it is help of a friend, if a help to a friend comes at the expense or through redistribution of public resources, it is a favour of access. The nature of formal constraints, the lack of private property or clear divisions between the public and the private in socialist societies, provides a degree of entitlement to whatever the economy of favours has to offer. As opposed to favours given, received or exchanged at the expense of personal resources, an economy of favours implies that a favour-giver is not only a giver but also a gatekeeper or a broker benefiting from the position of access and discretionary powers. It is also often the case that a favour-recipient is not only a beneficiary of a re-distributed object or service, delivered by a friend, a friend of a friend or a broker, but also a recipient of what s/he is entitled to have. In other words, a favour does not produce an outcome visibly different from that achieved in other ways (inheriting, rationing, queuing, purchasing in black market), which makes defining the boundaries even more difficult to establish.

To complicate matters further, the difference between sociability and instrumentality is defined not only by the source of resources (private or public) but also by the incentive (material or non-material). Thus, the intermediation of blat is essential to protect one's positive and altruistic self-image and to misrecognise one's own experiences: one helps a friend, not oneself, and that friend returns a favour eventually. Both parties maintain a 'good friend' self-image while using public resources for 'non-selfish' purposes. When the moral norms prescribe that one must help a friend but also that blat is immoral and unethical, the normative ambivalence—the partial 'misrecognition game'—is the way out.

Selfless re-distribution of public funds for a moral cause is not likely to be seen as self-serving, or corrupt. And yet, where there is a potential of mutuality, sociability breeds instrumentality. Selflessness of favours, or disinterested giving, is an essential feature of an economy of favours: 'I favour your interests, you favour mine, and we are both selfless and non-interested in material gain individuals.' Acting sociably, for a non-material and/or non-personal gain, allows the giver not to cross the borderline of a corrupt exchange, while the recipient of material gain is not in the position to re-direct public resources and technically does nothing wrong. Where a 'favour of access' involves the misuse of public office, the self-image is 'rescued' from being corrupt by an altruistic incentive and the lack of direct private gain.

In turn, non-material incentives may include all kinds of moral or emotional gains and losses. Apart from grace, noted by Julian Pitt-Rivers (2011) and Humphrey (2012), dignity and humiliation can certainly be brought into the discussion of non-material incentives. In literary sources, Eric Naiman observes, they seem to undergird just about every act of giving and receiving, and the recipient's sense of self-worth (dignity) and the degree of resentment he experiences, even—and perhaps especially—towards those who do the most for him are essential components in the understanding of the meaning and consequences of any favour. The sense of daily frustration surrounding the material aspects of much late-Soviet life surely had an impact on the giving and receiving of favours, and their perception.

THE BLURRED BOUNDARIES BETWEEN FAVOURS OF ACCESS AND CORRUPT TRANSACTIONS

The resemblance of blat favours aimed at circumventing formal rules and procedures—manipulating access to resources through direct purchase as in bribery or diverting of public resources for personal gain—makes them a member of a wider family of informal practices and complicates the matter of drawing the boundaries between favours and corrupt exchanges (Ledeneva 1998: 39-59). It also raises the question whether blat was in fact a dysfunctional corrupt practice. This may be the case in certain contexts but it is also misleading, for neither blat nor corruption have a clear or single meaning, nor are these terms independent of normative, context-free judgement (Ledeneva 2009). According to Lampert (1984: 371), cases of corruption have a ranking specific to the society. The Soviets clearly felt that bribery was a worse form of corruption than a small scale use of public resources for private ends (such as using workers to do private jobs in enterprise time). Cultural connotations

of money as 'dirty' made non-monetary transactions fairly legitimate (Humphrey, 2000). This was in tune with the distinction drawn between various forms of offence in the Criminal Code and the different penalties for engaging in them (Heinzen, 2007). Blat was not on the criminal scale at all and could not strictly speaking be characterized as illegal (by reason of its small scale or recognized necessity (*voiti v polozhenie*), thus falling in the category of 'good' or 'ambiguous' corruption (see also Krastev, 2004). The oppressive nature of the communist regime, and its centralized way of distribution of goods and privileges, introduces another twist in interpretation of the nature of blat practices: if blat corrupted the corrupt regime, can we refer to it as corruption? With these considerations in mind, to equate blat and corruption in Soviet conditions is to misunderstand the nature of Soviet socialism.

It is tempting to argue that blat subverted the Soviet system, and thus should be held responsible for undermining its principles and foundations leading to the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet blat also served the needs of socialist system, and thus supported its existence, operating contrary to the system's own acclaimed principles. Such functionality of the dysfunctional, or ambivalence, applies, for example, to the role of hackers in advancing cybersecurity (Ledeneva 2000; Assange et al. 2012). Apart from the ambivalent relationship (subversive/ supportive) with the Soviet institutions, blat produced a similar bearing on personal relationships—people were forced to use their personal networks instrumentally and that instrumentality helped to sustain those networks. People were made to want to be 'needed': former blatmeisters are nostalgic about blat, and *babushki* mind being replaced by professional child carers. The ambivalence of social networks is an interesting angle to explore as it helps identify similarities and differences in those conditions that make people use their networks for getting things done in different societies.

FROM ETHNOGRAPHY TO THE NEXT GENERATION INDICATORS

In my ethnographic fieldwork of economies of favours and informal governance, I have searched for signs of recognition of invisible matters one does not need to spell out: semi-taboos about economies of favours, complicity to leave things unarticulated, ambivalence of attitudes towards sensitive subjects. These are all pointers to the potentially innovative research. Societies' open secrets, such as economies of favour and others, have a great potential for novel research. However there are inevitable obstacles to the study of ambivalence, whether substantive, functional or normative.

Quantitatively, the size of economies of favours is even harder to assess than that of non-quantifiable forms of corruption, such as nepotism, conflict of interest, hospitality (TI 2011). The subjectivity of value of favours, their cross-cultural incomparability and ambivalence makes it impossible to measure the size of economies of favours objectively. Rather, one could assess a spread of the phenomenon, following the methodology of measuring perception, as in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). It should also be possible to measure the gap between the perception of others' use of favours and self-reported experience of giving and receiving favours. Given cultural specificity of economies of favours—there are often no exact translations of related idioms, slang, or jargon from one language to another—qualitative research is essential to establish the facilitating conditions, main gatekeepers, principles of inclusion and exclusion, multiplicity of norms, needs satisfied, degrees of obligation and codification, influence of kinship, tradition and religion, social inequality and other divisive narratives. The main challenge, however, is to create quantitative indicators for the 'immeasurable' that would grasp ambivalence, misrecognition, doublethink, and double standards, and that could potentially be comparable across societies and move beyond the existing paradigms of measuring corruption.

One unintended consequence of the 'informalisation' of global economy (Sassen) is that the existing indicators of performance and change are becoming less effective. In the studies of corruption, the contemporary global corruption paradigm (GCP) with its governance indicators and multiple indices seems to have exhausted its measurement and policy potential. On the one hand, it has been dubbed as a magnificent policy failure (Persson, Rothstein, Teorell 2013) due to its incapacity to achieve its proclaimed goal—to reduce corruption all over the world. On the other hand, the present paradigm has turned unequipped to handle the 'globalisation' of corruption practices, as majority of indices are tied to the countries, and to differentiate between cultural contexts, assuming that corruption would be the same everywhere. The aim of a colloquium hold at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Paris on 26-27 June was to explore the following questions:

- *Comparing the incomparable:* How to create culture sensitive next generation indicators that would be compatible with existing transnational surveys? Can Drazen Prelec's 'truth serum' methodology be applied to the corruption perception data (Prelec 2004)?
- *Corruption and political trust:* Which invisible practices we need to know about to assess the quality of government and governance comparatively? Which are the questions that could/should be included in general social or political surveys? What are the ways to assess the impact of the perception of corruption on political behaviors and attitudes?
- *Practical norms:* For the contexts of systemic corruption, one should search for the bottom-up, user-friendly indicators for informal practices, with focus on strength rather than frequency of relationships and practical norms rather than perceptions. How does media, new media and social media pin down practical norms? How to visualise and articulate the invisibility of informal practices?
- *Ambivalence of corruption:* Identifying societies' practical norms and open secrets, such as implicit acceptance of corrupt practices and their functionality, presents a challenge. Corruption gets lost between insiders' and outsiders' miscommunication. How to construct indicators that would reflect cultural differences and ambivalent attitudes towards corruption? How to tackle the issue of ambivalence of principal and agent roles, of public and private interests, of double standards and the Orwell's doublethink in contexts with systemic corruption. Is it possible to assess the spread of double standards in societies?
- *Norm reversal:* Within the existing measurements, how to distinguish indicators for the countries with systemic corruption—where corruption is a practical norm—from indicators for the countries where corruption is a deviation? Can a national-based comparison be replaced? What are the alternatives?
- *Nudge policies*: Following Richard Thaler and Cass Sunshine 'nudge' approach from behavioral science, is it possible to create indirect anti-corruption policies that would be small-scale, yet effective in changing people's behaviours? The idea is to explore the possibility of 'oblique' approach, suggested by John Kay in his Obliquity, for the anti-corruption policies.

> In my ethnographic fieldwork of economies of favours and informal governance, I have searched for signs of recognition of invisible matters one does not need to spell out: semi-taboos about economies of favours, complicity to leave things unarticulated, ambivalence of attitudes towards sensitive subjects.

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Ancien résident de l'IMéRA, Serge Proulx a publié *La contribution en ligne. Pratiques participatives à l'ère du capitalisme informationnel*, Presses de l'Université du Québec, 2014. Alors que les utilisateurs acceptent d'alimenter massivement de vastes corpus numériques, les entreprises propriétaires des plateformes du Web social captent les traces de ces contributions bénévoles qui, une fois accumulées dans des bases relationnelles de données, deviennent génératrices de valeur économique : c'est le capitalisme informationnel.
Comment interpréter ce phénomène contradictoire et paradoxal ? Pourrait-on parler d'un capitalisme de la contribution ? Cet ouvrage soulève les enjeux à la fois économiques, politiques, médiatiques et épistémiques de la contribution en ligne.

Article de Barbara ALLEN dans *Powerless Science?*

Barbara Allen, ancienne résidente, sociologue (*Virginia Tech University*), a contribué à l'ouvrage *Powerless Science? Science and Politics in a Toxic World* (Soraya Boudia and Nathalie Jas (ed.), Berghahn) avec l'article « rom Suspicious Illness to Policy Change in Petrochemical Regions: Popular Epidemiology, Science and the Law in the U.S. and Italy ».

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Cinquième anniversaire de l'IEA de Nantes

L'IEA de Nantes a réuni, les 23 et 24 juin derniers, ses anciens et actuels résidents à l'occasion de son 5^e^ anniversaire. Cet événement était le premier d'une série de rendez-vous intitulée *Poids et mesures du monde*, dont chaque édition sera l'occasion de discuter l'un des ouvrages publiés dans la collection du même nom créée par l'Institut aux éditions Fayard.

Ibrahima Thioub

Membre associé de l'IEA de Nantes, il a été nommé recteur de l'Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar. Il prend ainsi la tête de l'une des plus importantes universités d'Afrique francophone.

Collection « Poids et Mesures du Monde »

L'ouvrage *Hind Swaraj, La Voie de l'émancipation* paraîtra dans la collection dirigée par l'IEA de Nantes chez Fayard. Il s'agit de la traduction en français de l'édition critique d'un texte de Gandhi réalisée par Suresh Sharma, ancien résident, et Tridip Surup.

• IEA DE PARIS

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Ancien résident à l'IEA de Paris, il vient de publier *Popular Justice in Europe (18th-19th Centuries)*, il Mulino - Duncker & Humblot, Bologna - Berlin, 2014.

Marcel FOURNIER

Ancien résident à l'IEA de Paris, il a reçu le prix *History of Sociology Distinguished Scholarly Publication Award* de l'*American Sociological Association* lors du congrès annuel de la société qui a eu lieu du 15 au 19 août 2014 à San Francisco pour son ouvrage *Émile Durkheim : A Biography*, publié chez Polity Press en 2013.

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COLONISATION, GLOBALISATION ET VITALITÉ DU FRANÇAIS

Salikoko Mufwene et Cécile B. Vigouroux | anciens résidents du Collegium de Lyon

Professeur de linguistique à l'université de Chicago, Salikoko Mufwene porte ses recherches sur l'évolution linguistique ainsi que sur l'évolution phylogénétique du langage. Cécile Vigouroux est linguiste ethnographe de formation et professeure associée au département de français à l'université Simon Fraser (Colombie Britannique, Canada) où elle enseigne la sociolinguistique et l'histoire du français. Ce texte est extrait de l'ouvrage paru sous leur direction : **Colonisation, globalisation et vitalité du français** ***aux éditions Odile Jacob, 2013.***

Un examen de la littérature francophone contemporaine sur le français montre que la question de sa vitalité est souvent articulée en relation avec la notion de FRANCOPHONIE tant dans son acception comme communauté de locuteurs de français que dans celle de la « Francophonie institutionnelle », plutôt politique, réunissant des États et gouvernements ayant le « français en partage » (quelle que soit la proportion des locuteurs réels de cette langue). Cette mise en relation tend à servir deux positionnements en apparence contradictoires : 1) le français est une « grande » langue comme l'atteste son expansion sur différents continents ; 2) la vitalité du français est menacée par l'expansion de l'anglais, raison pour laquelle il faut resserrer les rangs de la Francophonie institutionnelle qui, elle, témoigne d'un respect pour la diversité linguistique et qui par sa seule existence contribue à la préserver. Le premier positionnement est construit à partir d'une homologie entre puissance économique (en l'occurrence ici coloniale) et grandeur d'une langue (déclinée au fil des siècles sous différentes formes) qui permet a posteriori de justifier un « combat » mené pour son maintien et sa diffusion : il faut tout faire pour que le français reste une « grande » langue (et ne devienne pas inférieur à son rival impérial : l'anglais). L'argument du maintien de la diversité linguistique du second positionnement n'est pas une spécificité des défenseurs du français ; il est plutôt l'application, aux langues, d'un discours plus général sur la défense de la biodiversité. /…/



Force est de constater que le discours sur la menace de l'anglais sur le français a, jusqu'à présent, rarement fait l'objet d'investigations ethnographiques permettant d'en évaluer l'ampleur, à part pour le Québec où les enjeux économiques, politiques et idéologiques de la présence de l'anglais sont ressentis d'abord comme une menace de l'intérieur, conséquence des enjeux écologiques locaux. Les quelques exemples souvent cités sur la pénétration de l'anglais dans le discours publicitaire français ou sur l'obligation faite aux employé(e)s de multinationales implantées sur le sol français de recourir à l'anglais sur le lieu de travail sont fondés, à notre connaissance, plus sur des impressions que sur des études ethnographiques. Pour revenir au cas du français, on peut dire que le discours militantiste (*advocacy*) sur les langues « indigènes » en danger véhiculé par les linguistes surtout anglo-saxons a non seulement alimenté ceux des défenseurs du français mais les a aussi légitimés. Si ce discours sur la « menace » à laquelle sont ou seraient exposées les langues « indigènes » suite à leurs contacts avec des langues coloniales européennes a trouvé un tel écho dans les assises de la Francophonie institutionnelle et parmi l'intelligentsia « francophoniste » de l'hémisphère Nord (notamment française et québécoise) à la fin du XX^e^ siècle, c'est parce qu'elle s'inscrit parfaitement dans l'histoire des discours sur le français, construit comme langue en danger depuis le XV^e^ siècle. Dans son chapitre, Douglas Kibbee montre ainsi comment la question de la « menace » sur le français s'est d'abord articulée autour d'une bataille sur la standardisation, avec en toile de fond des questions de légitimité sociale : par exemple, quelle prononciation favoriser et quelle orthographe utiliser. Ainsi, avant d'être de l'extérieur, la « menace » était perçue comme venant de l'intérieur. La peur de la « bâtardisation » du français est encore fortement ancrée dans les mentalités françaises hexagonales comme en attestent les résistances modernes aux simplifications orthographiques, d'ailleurs bien plus que dans les autres pays francophones ou la mise à l'index de variétés de français nées du contact entre populations françaises d'origine africaine vivant à la périphérie des grands centres urbains.

Si la « menace » de l'anglais est quant à elle constitutive de l'histoire du français depuis le XVI^e^ siècle, la manière dont elle s'articule emprunte désormais des formes nouvelles. Elle s'opère par un décentrement du français au profit de toutes les autres langues. Ainsi, l'anglais est présenté non plus comme une menace pour le français mais plus largement pour la diversité linguistique. Le décentrement de la bataille (français *vs* anglais) s'opère à partir d'un recentrement sur la francophonie où il ne s'agit plus de lutter contre l'anglais mais contre un effet de la mondialisation interprétée unilatéralement comme une américanisation de toutes les sociétés du monde. Ce glissement politique et sémantique est illustré par cet extrait du site Internet de l'Académie française : « La francophonie représente un groupe de pression apte à défendre la place du français dans les organisations internationales et à s'opposer à l'uniformisation culturelle que cherche à imposer le monde anglo-saxon ».

De la dichotomie « francophonie » vs « monde anglo-saxon », nous retiendrons ici deux éléments : 1) l'agentivité (« apte à défendre […] et à s'opposer ») donnée à la « francophonie » en tant que communauté des locuteurs du français définie comme « un groupe de pression » pour contrer l'hégémonie du « monde anglo-saxon » ; 2) le caractère prémédité et volontaire (« cherche à imposer ») du monde anglo-saxon à uniformiser le monde faisant des pays « réceptifs » à son influence, des réservoirs passifs. /…/

Ce décentrement du face-à-face idéologique (français vs anglais) s'articule aussi autour de la notion de « langues partenaires » (utilisée depuis à peu près 2000 dans les discours de la Francophonie institutionnelle et de ses organes) où le français est discursivement placé au même rang que les autres langues, notamment africaines, devant la menace que constitue l'anglais à leur survie. Ce repositionnement idéologique s'opère à partir d'un double processus d'« effacement » et de « récursivité » (respectivement, *erasure* et *recursivity* en anglais, selon Gal & Irvine, 1995).

Le processus d'effacement est celui de l'histoire linguistique ancienne et contemporaine française qualifiée d'hégémonique dans la mesure où elle a conduit à une disparition volontaire des langues régionales sur son sol national à travers l'imposition du français à l'école. Plus récemment, elle a conduit à la déculturation partielle de générations d'Africains scolarisés dans la langue du colonisateur. Il est à noter que le français est une des rares langues au monde à s'être diffusé surtout à travers l'institution scolaire même dans son territoire d'origine. Cela explique peut-être pourquoi les stratégies actuelles envisagées pour son maintien, notamment dans les pays d'Afrique, se concentrent principalement sur l'éducation scolaire, alors que l'école n'est pas une condition suffisante pour la survie d'une langue, comme l'attestent les cas contrastés de l'Irlande et du Québec. /…/ Le processus de récursivité quant à lui consiste à transposer une dynamique opérant à un niveau de relations, à un autre niveau. Ici, il s'opère par le déplacement du « combat pour le français », contre l'anglais, à celui d'un combat pour la défense de la diversité linguistique, qui concerne toutes les langues. Une telle opération de transposition implique que : 1) les langues soient considérées seulement d'un point de vue dénotationnel sans référence aucune à leur caractère indexical ; 2) le marché linguistique d'une écologie donnée ne soit pas envisagé comme stratifié : toute langue est socialement équivalente à toute autre, alors que les fonctions sociales des langues sont hautement hiérarchisées ; 3) dans les écologies où le français maintient son statut hégémonique de langue officielle, il est tout à fait normal de maintenir le statu quo. Il semble importer peu aux chantres du « partenariat langagier » que les locuteurs des langues dites « partenaires » puissent penser que ce partenariat sert plus au maintien du français langue impériale qu'à la préservation des langues indigènes, qui bénéficient de peu de soutien institutionnel sur le terrain. En effet, les langues vernaculaires (officiellement) absentes du système scolaire ou qui sont pariées par des populations peu nombreuses ne sont pas prises en compte. Aucune indication ne nous est donnée qui montre que la Francophonie institutionnelle soit consciente du fait que certaines de ces langues vernaculaires si ce n'est toutes, sont menacées par les vernaculaires urbains qui fonctionnent aussi comme *lingua franca* régionales. Au regard de ce constat, on est tenté de penser que le spectre de la globalisation agité par la Francophonie institutionnelle comme le nouveau coupable de l'« éradication linguistique » n'est qu'un prétexte pour continuer le combat déjà long contre l'anglais, mais sous d'autres formes. Au regard de ce qui vient d'être dit, la question de la vitalité du français à l'âge de la globalisation est un sujet multidimensionnel, depuis son expansion en Europe jusqu'à son exportation vers d'autres territoires et son appropriation par des populations pour lesquelles il n'est pas une langue d'héritage ancestrale. Compte tenu de la diversité des écologies dans lesquelles le français est présent, il paraît présomptueux pour une institution ou des individus de préconiser une stratégie commune à adopter pour préserver la vitalité du français, si besoin il y avait, ou la diversité linguistique et culturelle.